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 This thesis focuses on the Cod Recovery Plan that was implemented in the Irish Sea in 
2004. The plan was constructed within the Common Fisheries Policy, and applied to several 
European cod stocks that was fished unsustainably.  It involved a system of measures 
including drastic reduction in TACs, closed spawning area, technical conservation measures 
and effort restriction in the form of “Days at Sea.” This was not new to the fisheries in this 
area since the three former measures had been applied from 2000 as ICES gave warnings 
about the poor state of this particular stock.   
The implementation process has been characterised by conflicts, horse-trading and lack of 
evaluation. For many in the industry the measures have been draconian, others will claim they 
should have been tougher. Many differing but entangled factors and interests are involved and 
together with a high degree of complexity and unclear objectives the lack of legitimacy may 
be undermining the plan. This work sets out to evaluate the implementation process of the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 “Almost every way you look at fisheries the trends are in the wrong direction: 
decreasing catch per unit effort despite improved technology, reduced fish abundance, 
average size and reproductive output, loss of genetic variation, replacement of high-value 
species by trash fish, increased by-catch mortality, recruitment failures, habitat 
degradation…the litany continues.” These are the words of Callum M. Roberts (1997). Over-
fishing due to intensive exploitation is frequently cited as an important factor contributing to 
the collapse of marine fish stocks (Hutchings 2005, Roberts 1997). 
 Recovery Plans in the management of fisheries resources are sets of measures 
introduced when there is a resource crisis in terms of depleted fish stocks. The measures can 
vary, but often include reduced quotas, closed areas and technical measures; the goal is to 
rebuild the fish stock. In the wake of the last reform of the Common Fisheries Policy recovery 
plans have been included and applied for several European fish stocks.  
 In 2004 a recovery plan was implemented for cod in the Irish Sea because this stock 
had been estimated to be under safe biological limits since the end of the 1990s. The recovery 
plan included reduction in Total Allowable Catch (TAC), closed spawning area, technical 
conservation measures and effort restriction in the form of “Days at Sea” in addition to some 
control measures. But already since 2000 the first three measures had been restricting the 
fishery in this area in the form of interim recovery measures. In other words, the cod fishery 
in the Irish Sea had been under recovery measures already for 3 years when the actual 
Recovery Plan came along.  
 The interim measures and the Cod recovery Plan have been painful for the industry 
and fishermen involved, while unclear and immeasurable goals have made it difficult to 
achieve legitimacy. Thus incentives to commit to the plan must be assumed to be poor and the 
implementation process has been difficult, involving conflicts and horse-trading.  
This is of no surprise since management of scarce natural resources tend to be controversial 
where uncertainty in scientific models and diagnostics combined with vested and multiple 
interests often represent major obstacles. There are theories addressing different drivers of 
conflicts based on natural resource management (Nie 2003).   
 Such implementation processes need to be analysed in order to evaluate whether the 
lack of legitimacy is preventing the measures in fulfilling their objectives. In this thesis I will 
discuss the measures taken for the recovery of cod in the Irish Sea in order to reveal the 
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possible drivers involved in this resource conflict, starting with the implementation of the 
interim measures from 2000 and continuing with the actual plan until 2006. 
 
The main research questions are:   
1. Is the Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan likely to achieve its objectives of rebuilding the 
cod stock?  
 
2. What aspects are interfering with the objectives of the Recovery Plan?  
  
This introductory chapter is meant to give the reader background information on the 
different aspects that will be touched upon in this thesis. In addition the main objectives of the 
thesis will be outlined together with the applied method.  
 
 
1.1. Fisheries science 
 
 What is going on underneath the sea surface is difficult to observe and control, and 
grasping the full effect of fishing is therefore a difficult and maybe even  impossible task. 
There are however, techniques and models worked out in order to monitor for instance the 
effect of fishing. Beverton and Holt introduced in 1957 a book on the dynamics of Exploited 
Fish Populations leading directly to the formation of fishery catch equation. This was the 
initiation of modern fishery science and management, although the computerised techniques 
applied in fisheries science today is difficult to compare to what was presented by Beverton 
and Holt.  
 The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is an organization 
created to coordinate fisheries research. It was established as early as in 1902, with the 
objective of conducting international investigations of the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas 
with a primary focus on the North Atlantic. The Council aims at being independent and 
objective providing research-based non-political advice and information to managers of fish 
resources. 19 countries are members of and fund this organization, and all member countries 
contribute with their scientific results concerning fish stock assessment amongst other things. 
The whole operation involves more than 1600 scientists and is coordinated through a system 
of committees. The Council has regular meetings once a year, and the result is a report which 
includes the estimated state of the different fish stocks. In addition the proposed catch 
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amounts of the different stocks for the subsequent year are made public. These are called 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and have been the core of much controversy throughout the 
years since the tendency in the last decades has been that the proposed TACs have been too 
low to avoid reactions and consequently the applied TACs have been too high to avoid 
concern. The advices are provided by the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management 
(ACFM) in an Advisory report. Because life history traits such as mortality, growth, age at 
maturity, size at maturity etc., are affected by fishing and are also critical in determining the 
population growth rate, they may be used as indices of population viability (Rochet 2000). 
These indices have been applied in many assessment and catch models where particularly the 
mortality rate and the size of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) in different stocks have 
proven to be useful indicators of the state of the stock. The motivation is to keep exploitation 
within safe biological limits. A number of different criteria such as the size of the spawning 
stock in relation to the historical trends, the fishing pressure on the stock, the age structure 
and exploitation pattern of the stock and its distribution indicate when a stock is outside safe 
biological limits. In considering weather a stock is within or outside Safe Biological Limits 
the responsible scientists use all indicators available to them. Some reference points or 
indicators, used by ICES include Minimum Biological Acceptable Level (MBAL) which is 
the spawning stock size level below which depletion might be the result if current levels of 
exploitation continue. The MBAL is used by ICES as an indicator of those stocks, for which 
quick restorative action is needed (Miljøverndepartementet 2001: http://odin.dep.no). In 
relation to predefined negative limits, reference points should be considered as bench marks 
giving information of the status of stocks in the management quest for keeping exploitation 
within safe biological limits (Collie and Gislason 2001,  Miljøverndepartementet 2001: 
http://odin.dep.no). In 1997 a Study Group for the ICES Advisory Committee met in order to 
incorporate the precautionary approach into the process of providing advice. It needs to be 
mentioned here that the precautionary approach includes taking action before it is too late, we 
will however return to this concept more thoroughly later.  It was consequently decided that 
ICES were to consider uncertainties of the status of stocks into their assessment models of 
which for instance both rate of fishing mortality and biomass reference points are parts in 
addition to thresholds ensuring that limit reference point are not exceeded. From this time on 
the precautionary mortality reference point, Fpapa , and the precautionary SSB reference point, 
BBpp aa  have constrained the advices from ICES following the recipe of the Annex II of the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995 (Kell at el 1999, United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement 1995). By introducing these reference points, the hope is that the fishing mortality 
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Figure 1: fishing mortality and spawning stock biomass 
reference points ICES uses to define precautionary region. 
If SSB falls below BBpp aa    because Fpp aa    is set too high or is exceeded, and shows no prognosis of 
recovering to above BpaBpa  in the short term,  a recovery plan will be advised. By successfully 
implementing a plan that within reasonable time is expected to reduce fishing mortality to no 
higher that Fpapa  and rebuild SSB to above BBpp aa , management would be considered to act in 
consistence with the precautionary approach (Kell at el 1999). 
 The role of ICES has been debated because the proposed TACs have been overlooked 
by governments and managers, and therefore the proposed TACs for the next year have been 
further reduced. A lot of uncertainties are involved in the process of determining the reference 
points, and the credibility of the precautionary approach is questionable if the limits that one 
should strive to achieve are decided based on untrustworthy assessment inputs. ICES have 




1.2. The European Union and the Common Fisheries policy (CFP) 
 
 The European Union is the third largest fishery producer in the world with a fleet of 
approximately 92.000 vessels. In 2000 EU fishermen took 7.2 million tonnes of fish and 
shellfish, and 86% of the catch took place in the northeast Atlantic. The fishing sector’s 
overall share of the gross national product of the member states is less than 1%, but it still 
quite influential because it is crucial to many regions. Initially the EU countries all had 
national fishery policies, which were destabilised by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), 
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recognised by the Court of Justice of the EC in 1976. This was together with the common 
agricultural and trade policy, one of the rare policies placed under the sole authority of the 
European Community as it was called at this time. Accordingly the fishing sector of Europe is 
thought of as being fragmented consisting of many fishing industries with products from the 
sea as a common denominator. The CFP is a complex policy that covers all aspects of 
fisheries such as conservation, control and surveillance, marketing and agreement with non-
EU members. It actually manages fisheries for all vessels fishing within community waters 
(Sustainable fisheries through regional Management 2000). 
 The CFP has been based on the system of relative stability, implying that the fish is 
shared between member countries according to their historical level of fishing. The basis for 
this division is the scientific advice, which together with social aspects defines a TAC that is 
agreed upon by Member States each December in the Fisheries Council. The Scientific, 
Technical and Economic Committee of Fisheries (STECF) is made up of representatives from 
each member state and is composed of biologists, economists and fishing gear technologists.
The STECF is asked by the Commission to examine and comment on the advice it receives 
from ICES (Lequesne 2004).
 But the CFP has for a long time suffered a bad reputation of failing its intentions. Fish 
stocks have been steadily declining and in spite of scientists’ repetitive warnings since the 
early 90s some stocks are on the verge of collapse. Thousands of fishermen have lost their 
jobs and a lot of money has been spent on building up the fishing fleet only to scale it back 
down again. The marine environment is said to be damaged due to fishing which has led to 
uncontrolled death of other species, such as turtles, harbour porpoises and sea birds. By 
ignoring the scientists the politicians and managers are accused of having favoured short-term 
interests before long term sustainability resulting in many fish stocks being near a state of 
commercial extinction. European Union fishermen have also been encouraged to fish 
elsewhere, due to overcapacity in their own waters, resulting in decimation of local fisheries 
in some of the poorest areas of the world in the process 
 
1.3. Reform of the CFP 
 
 Increased public awareness of the severity of the state of some fish stocks led the 
Union to the acknowledgement that a reform was called for. The plan had been to make a 
review of the CFP in 2002, ten years after the last one, and this provided an opportunity for 
revising the policy (Foodaware 2002: http://www.net-consumers). 
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  In 2001 a Green Paper was launched presenting a new fisheries policy with advice 
and propositions for future conduct in accordance with the precautionary approach and the 
ecosystem approach. Prior to this many regional meetings and hearings were held in order to 
reveal the problem areas (Report from the Commission 24.01.2000 COM(2000)). Long-term 
management, increased stakeholder participation, integration of environmental concerns, 
more uniform and better regulations and reduction of the capacity of the fishing fleet were 
some of the main areas that needed upgrading (European Commission Green Paper 2001). For 
instance was the forth Multi Annual Guidance Program (MAGP IV) accepted to be a failure 
as a fleet reduction program since the situation in 2002 was that all in all 10 vessels were 
chasing fish that no more than 5 or 6 could catch in order  to act sustainable. The fleet 
reduction targets of the MAGP IV were said to be too low and the rules too complicated and it 
was proposed replaced by the general multi-annual management plans that will lead to 
restrictions of the fleet. (Europea Press releases 2002 (28/5): 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleases) The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG) was started in 1999 and is planned to end in 2006. It was in serious need of reform in 
order to avoid funding of replacements for the scrapped ships which counteract the intended 
effort reduction of the MAGP. It was suggested that the money saved would be spent on 
scrapping vessels in addition to social measures helping fishers find alternative employment 
(Hagan 2003 OceanLaw online: http://www.intfish) 
From 1st of January 2003 the EU has followed a new fishery policy based on the 
suggestions of the Green paper. Focus is more strongly on protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, and in the wake of this, effort have been put on proposing common 
management strategies for marine areas of shared interest. One example is the European 
Marine Strategy elaborated in the framework of the Community’s 6th Environment Action 
Programme aiming at protecting the European Seas.  
 A brand new forum has been established as a result of the endeavour to increase 
stakeholder involvement which was one of the main points of the reform. These are the 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) which are stakeholder-led organisations functioning as 
consultative organs for the Commission in matters concerning proposals for measures that 
relate specifically to fisheries in the area concerned. RACs are at present established for: the 
Baltic Sea; the Mediterranean Sea; the North Sea; north-western waters; south-western 
waters; pelagic stocks; high seas/long distance fleet. The Irish Sea is included in the north-
western waters RAC (including ICES areas V (excluding Va and only EC waters in Vb), VI, 
VII). 
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1.4. Recovery plans as a tool to counteract crisis 
 
 One definition of the word recovery is “the act of regaining or saving something lost.” 
(Answers.com 2006:http://www.answers.com). A recovery plan must in this respect be 
measures added to regain or save something lost. The concept of recovery plan is used in 
many fields, but a trend is that it appears after catastrophes or along with the 
acknowledgement of crisis. Crisis can occur in any part of society and can involve economic, 
natural and social aspects amongst others. Situations leading up to crisis can be caused by 
disasters such as earthquakes, epidemics, man-made negative impacts, market failures etc. 
Considering many living natural resources in this respect, the last century at least has born 
witness of over-exploitation and other indirect negative impact of human behaviour. The 
United States Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 states that there are species that have 
been so depleted that they are threatened by extinction, and provides programs for the 
recovery and conservation of such species (Endangered species act of 1973). This act defines 
recovery as the process by which the decline of an endangered or threatened species is 
arrested or reversed, and threats removed or reduced so that the species' long-term survival in 
the wild can be ensured” (US Fish and Wildlife Service 2005: http://www.fws.gov, U. S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service 2004: http://www.fws.gov).  
 Experiences with recovery plans mostly stem from 1990s onwards and the concept 
was initially used for terrestrial organisms. The first fishery recovery plans historically were 
fish closures, where more successes was documented for pelagic fisheries than demersal 
 (Caddy and Agnew 2004). 
 The foundation of recovery plans in fisheries is laid in several United Nations reports. 
Although not used directly in article 61 of the United Nations Convention on the law of the 
Sea of 10th of December 1982 (UNCLOS), coastal states are encouraged to ensure that living 
resources are not endangered by over-exploitation. This is to be achieved through proper 
conservation and management measures based on the best scientific advice.  
The UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was created as a result of the 
acknowledgement that fisheries resources could no longer sustain the excessive extent of 
exploitation. It started as an initiative at the 1992 UN Conference on Responsible Fishing held 
in Cancun where FAO was requested to prepare an international Code of Conduct. The work 
was initiated in 1993 and completed in 1995 at a conference in Rome. The code addresses 
proper conduct for all involved in fisheries in one way or another, including advice and 
measures that should be taken into consideration. It is formulated to be in accordance with 
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many relevant instruments such as the above mentioned UNCLOS, the 1992 Declaration of 
Cancun, and the 1992 Rio declaration amongst others. The Code is not legally binding 
although parts of it will be recognised in national jurisdiction (Juda 2001). The Code of 
Conduct does not actually use the exact words recovery plan, but the word recovery is 
mentioned in relation to sustainable management. For instance in article 7 it is applied under 
the objectives of management where it is stated that appropriate measures should be adopted 
to provide that depleted stocks should be allowed to recover or, be actively restored. Later in 
the same article it is written that: “States and subregional fisheries management organisations 
and arrangements should introduce measures for depleted resources and those resources 
threatened with depletion that facilitates the sustained recovery of such stocks.” The 
importance of long-term management planning and of implementing the precautionary 
approach into the management scheme is also addressed here (FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries).  
 
 
1.5. Precautionary approach, ecosystem approach and recovery plans 
 
 The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995 (entered into force in 2001) was 
created to help fill the gaps of the UNCLOS concerning straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks. It emphasises the importance if implementing the precautionary approach in 
management of fisheries and also to concentrate on ecosystem-based measures instead of 
considering each stock isolated (Stokke and Coffey 2004). In article 6 of this document the 
application of precautionary approach is addressed, and states are encouraged to take action to 
restore stocks that have been pushed too close to reference points, before they are exceeded. 
Target reference points are to be guidelines for management, whereas the limit or 
conservation reference points are supposed to give the boundary between sustainable and non-
sustainable harvesting. The guidelines for such reference points are given in annex II of this 
agreement, where it is also written that management strategies shall include action to be taken 
when precautionary reference points are approached (United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
1995) 
 The precautionary principle derives from the German Vorsorgeprinzip which 
comprised the idea that society should seek to avoid environmental damage by careful 
forward planning. The principle developed in the early 1970s into a fundamental part of 
German environmental law. Initially the concept was recognised in the World Charter of 
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Nature, adopted in 1982 by the UN General Assembly, and subsequently adopted by the First 
International Conference on Protection of the North Sea in 1984 (Guldberg 2003). After being 
used excessively in many international statements and policies, it was inlcuded in the Rio 
Declaration of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(Agenda 21). The principle was formally adopted by countries of the European Union in the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 where it plays a crucial role in environmental health policy 
development, and in general forms the basis for European environmental law (Foster et al 
2000, Guldberg 2003).  It is evident that the approach springing from this principle has 
become an important tool for policy making, but there is controversy concerning its 
application. The most crucial problem concerns its definition, or definitions which consist of 
many slightly differing ones. This opens up for abuse and misinterpretations that in turn may 
lead to mischief such as trade protectionism (Foster et al 2000). In the Rio Declaration the 15th 
principle states that:   “In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” This definition of 
the precautionary approach has been widely used, although looking at it closely it is not 
actually a definition, rather a recipe for the application, with many undefined words. It is 
however clear that the application of this principle is motivated by a wish to be safe rather 
than sorry in the sense that lack of scientific knowledge shall be no excuse for postponing 
precaution. Guldberg (2003) is criticising this very statement saying that we are asked to curb 
actions on the basis of what we do not know instead of what we do know.  Keiding and 
Budtz-Jørgensen state in their article from 2005 that in searching for effects in statistical 
analysis, the results may either be to weak or too noisy (Type II error) to draw precise 
conclusions. They continue by saying that in drawing precautionary conclusions from 
empirical evidence, the type II errors are said to be the main problem. This is because there 
are two very different reasons for the available data not containing evidence against a 
hypothesis: either there may indeed be no effect or an effect of a size below biological interest, 
or the data may be too noisy often because there are too few of them, to enable any precise 
conclusion (Keiding and Budtz-Jørgensen 2005). In other words however good the idea of 
staying within precautionary limits is, there will always be uncertainty concerning the validity 
of the reference points  
 The Ecosystem Approach is another new tool for management of natural resources. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity is an international agreement that was adopted at the 
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Earth Summit in Rio on 1992. The agreement is often seen as the key document regarding 
sustainable development and the aim is to develop national strategies for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity. The convention defines the Ecosystem approach as “a 
strategy for the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes 
conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way. “ (The Convention on Biological 
Diversity).  In order to keep the track straight, I will move on to the understanding of this 
concept in terms of fisheries management where the emphasis is put on managing human 
activity in a fashion that provides sustainable use of goods and services while maintaining 
ecosystem integrity. This is to be achieved by undertaking the best scientific knowledge of the 
ecosystem and its dynamics in order to avoid action that compromises the health of the marine 
ecosystems. The approach is based on long-term perspective and emphasises the dependence 
of economic and social sustainability on ecological sustainability. Economic and social 
objectives should be met without compromising ecological objectives (ICES 2005).  
Addressing this approach even more specifically to fisheries, it implies that factors such as the 
physical environment and other species such as prey influences the harvested species. The 
Ecosystem-based approach to management of fisheries seeks to consider the biological, 
chemical and physical components of the ecosystem, and their interaction.  The emphasis is 
put on appreciating the dynamics of natural ecosystems but in addition seeking to include 
stakeholders in management decisions in recognising that man is a part of the ecosystem. In 
the modern fisheries management quest to consider biological diversity and provide 
sustainable ecosystems, it is suitable to adopt an approach that takes into consideration that 
the environment influences fisheries and vice versa. In addition taking account of ecological 
interactions and stakeholder participation. The approach has gained territory as traditional 
single species fisheries management have failed to consider the influence of the physical 
environment and other species such as prey, on the harvested species in addition to social 
aspects and human behaviour.  
 According to the Joint Nature Conservation Committee the process towards complete 
integration of the approach must be incremental and include 
1. The identification of the relevant ecosystems, and their boundaries and characteristics;  
2. the agreement of management objectives for each ecosystem. These should encompass 
wider ecosystem factors and not just the target stock, and all stakeholder groups 
should be involved in their development;  
3. long-term management objectives should be developed as well as short to medium-
term objectives;  
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4. the establishment of sustainability indicators (including reference points, targets and 
limits) and the accompanying monitoring;  
5. a decentralised regional approach to fisheries management in EU waters, enabling 
management measures to be taken that are appropriate to biologically distinct areas. 
These could include technical measures, spatial management (including No-Take 
Zones), effort-related controls and systems of access rights;  
6. there should be better tailoring of research and information provision to support the 
ecosystem approach, including better knowledge of ecosystem interactions, and of 
fishing-related impacts, and also improved monitoring bycatch and discards to include 
information of non-commercial bycatch;  
7. application of Adaptive Management and the Precautionary Principle given the degree 
of uncertainty and dynamics of the ecosystem;  
8. an effective enforcement capability;  
9. Furthermore, fisheries management should not be seen in isolation from the wider 
management of the marine environment. Over time, fisheries management will need to 
become much better integrated with other sectors of marine management. 
(http://www.jncc.gov.uk/page-1576) 
  
 The precautionary approach and the ecosystem approach are important backgrounds 
for recovery plans in general.    
 
1.6. Objectives of the study 
  
Recovery Plan is a concept or system of tools aiming at rebuilding something on the verge of 
being lost.  In the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union it is implemented in order 
to rebuild depleted fish stocks. This thesis aims at evaluating aspects and traits of 
implementing such recovery plans and in order to do this an investigation and evaluation of 
the Cod Recovery Plan of the Irish Sea has been conducted. Because this has not been done 
before, this thesis will put emphasis on enlightening the empirical parts as much as possible in 
order to give a thorough introduction and evaluation of the states of affair in the period of the 
Cod Recovery Measures in the Irish Sea. As will be revealed in this thesis is that the 
informants will be let to tell the story of the Cod Recovery Plan through quotes from the 
interviews because this was the best way of communicating the story. In addition a 
presentation of the Recovery Measures withdrawn from the Council Regulations will be 






 The methods I have used to achieve the information I am presenting here are first of 
all open ended interviews. The choice of method can be explained by the fact that this is a 
new practice in fisheries management, one for which the implementation process has not been 
investigated previously, thus there was a need to reveal what has been taking place. Because 
this could not be found in previous research an empirical basis was called for. Scientific 
articles, EU regulations, on-line articles and information in addition to some governmental 
debates have been applied as backup information. One of the aims of this project was to 
reveal what has been going on in society under the implementation process and this is the 
reason for the extensive use of internet sources and some parliamentary debates.  
 The interviews all took place Ireland from the 27th of March to the 1st of April 2006. A 
list of questions had been prepared and forwarded to the interviewees in advance, but used 
mainly as a helping document during the interviews. Five interviews were conducted and this 
is the list of the informants: 
 
Joe Maddock, Chairman of the Irish Fishermans Organisation 
Dominic Rihan, Marine Technical Executive at the Irish Sea Fisheries Board (BIM)
One 
Interview
Emmet Jackson, Marine Technical Officer of the BIM 
Patricia Comiskey, Quality and Environment Project Co-ordinator of the BIM 
Lorcan Ó Cinnéide chief executive officer (CEO) of the Irish Fish Producers' Organisation 
Alan McCulla Chief Executive of Anglo-North Irish Fish Producers Organisation 
Ciaran Kelly Fisheries Scientist Pelagic Section, Fisheries Science Services (FSS), Marine 
Institute 
 In addition I made a brief telephone interview with Barrie Deas, Chief Executive of 
The National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations (UK). 
 I would have liked to hear the story from someone working with this from within the 
EU system, and from someone in the government of Ireland and UK. In addition it would 
have been interesting to get some input from the Isle of Man, as they take share in this fishery. 
This was however, not possible to achieve, the first and last because the resources did not 
allow a second trip, or an extended one, the latter because I could not get in touch with 
anyone willing to talk at the actual department in Ireland. This is why this thesis includes the 
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story told from the perspective of the industry mainly, but also from the scientific point of 
view.  
 In order to record the interviews I used a video camera to which no one objected. This 
proved to be very valuable because by watching the tapes you get more information than from 
simply listening to people speak.  










































Chapter 2. Theoretical background 
 
 
 There are several theories I could have included in this thesis such as Fisheries 
Governance, Co-management and adaptive management. Several of these might however 
have demanded removal of essential parts of the empirical testimonies. The choice of theory 
is a result of searching for one that would grasp the interdisciplinary nature of this conflict 
area, and in addition would include as much of the total story as possible. This is why I have 
landed on Martin Nies Drivers of natural resource-based political conflicts (2003), because it 
starts out with investigating tame and wicked problems, which can be viewed as natural 
science vs. social problems, and in addition provides an opportunity to reveal some of the 




2.1. Wicked and Tame problems 
 
The overall theme of Martin Nies article (2003) is the difficult nature of some natural 
resource-based political conflicts (that seem to share a row of not very positive features such 
as being controversial, acrimonious and intractable). In his opinion conflicts need to be 
analysed according to multiple drivers that interact in a complex manner. It is important to 
find ways around such environmental political conflicts because they seem to be increasing in 
number and intensity. Controversial political conflicts over natural resource policy have 
become the norm, and finding solutions to such problems require going beyond scientific, 
economic and techno-rational analysis and methods.  
 According to Rittel and Webber (1973) problems can be either wicked or tame, the 
latter indicating problems for which there is a right and a wrong answer, the problem is well 
defined and the problem solver will know when he has the solution at hand. Such problems 
will often be dealt with within the natural sciences (Nie 2003). A wicked problem is one for 
which there is no definite formulation, there is no true or false answer rather a good or bad 
solution. In the formulation of the solution lies the formulation of the problem. One fictive 
example could be: “the safety condition of fishermen on the boats is poor” This is a problem 
brought forth as a statement which if you turn it around will become the solution: “we need to 
improve the safety conditions of fishermen on the boats.” The problem represents many 
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wreathed factors and constraints. The nature and understanding of the problem will also be 
different depending on the position of the problem solver.  
 Because there is no stopping rule (no criteria to tell when the solution has been 
reached), the solution process stops when there is no money, time or patience left. But the 
solution to a wicked problem is never true or false rather good or bad and there will always be 
a possibility to find a better solution.  
 Contrary to the tame-problem, evaluation of a solution to a wicked problem is very 
complicated because implementation of the solution will generate waves of consequences, 
some of which may outweigh the intended advantage of the proposed solution. With tame 
problems one can determine quite accurately how good a solution has been. What intensifies 
the complex nature of the wicked one is the fact that each problem is unique depriving the 
problem-solver of learning by trial-and-error. To make it even worse every implemented 
solution to a wicked problem leaves traces that cannot be undone.  
 There is a lack of a predefined potential set of solutions to wicked problems against 
which one can evaluate solutions to a problem and thus feasible action plans must rely on 
judgement of the proposed solutions. For tame problems there are explicit characters that 
define similarities among them but for wicked ones no matter how similar they may appear, 
there may always be one or more small difference that is of overriding importance. So, they 
are essentially unique, and the art of dealing with them is not knowing too early what solution 
to apply.  
 Problems in general can be described as discrepancy between what is and what should 
be and the process of resolving the problem involves explaining the causes of the discrepancy. 
By removing one cause for discrepancy, another problem may appear for which the original 
problem is a symptom. For instance if the remedy for improving the safety on fishing boats is 
decided to be handing out money to each fishermen to improve his boat, it may end up with 
fishermen investing in better equipment because it is more important for them to secure 
steady income than to improve safety. The original problem will be a symptom of a “higher 
level” problem, and although the higher level of a problem the more complicated it gets, one 
should try to settle the problem on as high a level as possible. 
 The choice of explanation decides the nature of the resolution to wicked problems. 
This choice is decided by the “world view” of the analyst. There will always be many 
stakeholders involved in wicked problems each representing varying ideas of what the 
problem is, what causes it and how to solve it, in addition these ideas may change along the 
line.  
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 Planners are liable for the consequences of possible solutions to wicked problems and 
such solutions are not based on finding the truth but improve some characteristics of the world. 
The effects of the solution may have large consequences on the people affected by actions it 
generates. Planners do not have the benefit of testing possible solutions in the form of 
hypothesis that prevails in the world of science.  
  
 
2.2. Nies drivers of natural resource-based political conflicts 
 
 In the article Nie lists several factors that contribute to the conflicts around natural 
resources and a summary of these will follow: 
 
Scarcity:  
 Within this concept lies the notion that resources become more valuable when they are 
scarce and even more so when the point is reached where many scientists and conservationists 
believe that the evolutionary process itself may be at stake. Scarcity goes hand in hand with 
the population growth and new technological development coinciding with increased pressure 
on the natural resources. In some areas such as many fisheries, there may be over-
appropriation and too many people want too much from the same resource base, a scarcity 
factor that will propose a major challenge to finding a resolution. Collaborative conservation 
may also fail because many conservationists feel that compromise on top of compromise 
eventually leads to nothing left to compromise.  
 
The Policy Surrogate: 
 Some policy problems can be used by political actors as surrogate to put larger and 
more controversial issues on the agenda and in this way they become multidimensional 
conflicts with a variety of interests involved. The issues arising from addressing surrogate 
agendas are contributing to the complexity of finding resolutions to problems, but they must 
nevertheless be confronted. In this way relatively straight forward policy problems may turn 
wicked because they are used as surrogates.  
 
The sacred and spiritual, and importance of place: 
 Some areas or resources may be significant to people beyond providing some goods to 
be extracted, because they represent something sacred either from a religious point of view or 
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simply for habitual and cultural reasons. The latter can explain people’s reluctance to move 
from an area of depleted resources to find employment elsewhere. 
 
Policy design: 
 Some conflicts are rooted in policies designed in a specific historical context, and we 
need to go to the history to explain their occurrence. These are in the article termed “lords of 
yesterday.” From a contemporary point of view such “Lords of Yesterday” may contribute to 
an absurd way of dealing with political aspects since they do not represent logic in their 
present context. But in spite of being outmoded they continue to exert tremendous influence 
(Cortner 2000). According to an article by Daniels and Walker (1996) ecosystem based 
management of natural resources have helped federal agencies of natural resource 
management to move away from the “Lords of yesterday.”  
 
Policy frames: 
 Framing a conflict involves interpreting it, identifying who is involved, why it occurs, 
what it deals with and how it could be resolved  and this process is according to Nie one 
reason why so many conflicts are intractable. Policy frames can be explained by the same 
story told by different political actors, and the story will be edited as how to best represent the 
opinion of each party. The fundamental story in policy writing may be hidden by surface 
details. The policy frames need to be identified in order to fully understand a conflict. 
 
Scientific disagreement and uncertainty: 
 According to Nie in natural resource policy and management are more and more 
characterised by conflicts between different aspects of science, and such “science wars” have 
further complicated an already difficult decision making process. Uncertainty complicates 
matters even further because it makes every decision into a risky business. If a species 
wellbeing is at stake there is no certainty as to weather a measure will be hazardous or 
beneficial or simply not matter. In order to reveal this more research is needed and this can 
take time during which decisions have to be made, and this opens up for making decisions 
that everybody might not agree upon. Scientific disagreement is interrelated to the other 
drivers of conflict because value- and interest based political conflicts may be framed as 
scientific ones, the scientific language complicates matters and different groups may use 
different science to forward their objectives. Nie is not saying we should not use science in 
decision making, but we should be careful about asking science to resolve them.  
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Electoral politics and wedge issues: 
 A wedge issue is a social or political issue, often of a divisive or otherwise 
controversial nature, which is used by one political group to split apart or create a "wedge" in 
the support base of an opposing political group (Wikipedia 2006 wedge issue: 
http://en.wikipedia.org) 
 Political campaigning for electoral advantage involves using symbolic issues to win 
territory or to keep voters. Such issues have a tendency of reoccurring every 2-4-6 years for 
short term political advantage, but has the unfortunate effect of deepening conflicts. 
 
Political and interest group strategy: 
 Other actors such as environmental interest groups and the wise use movement 
(American opposite to environmental movements) also use environmental issues for political 
advantage such as gaining or maintaining members and raise money. Crisis orientation is an 
effective way to get attention, and some of these are actual crisis due to the scarcity factor 
discussed above. In other cases this crisis maximisation is abused and the result is lost 
credibility, questionable legitimacy and “cry wolf” impression. This can result in public 
debates being run by incentives to win and not to reach consensus and in such represent a 
polarisation driven by propaganda and “wolf-crying.”   
 In such interest strategies framing and reframing the conflict will be used in 
competing information campaigns in which the goal is not to communicate with each other 
but to the public and political decision makers. The groups answer to the previous move of its 
opponent and this is what drives the conflict further. This is according to Nie a dysfunctional 
communicative strategy that makes it difficult to stop such conflicts.  
  Media plays an important role in such wicked environmental conflicts and 
unfortunately the result is often increased confusion and biased impressions. David Symes 
points to a European example in his article from 2005 when he comments on the way a report 
of the Royal Commission of UK called “Turning the Tide: addressing the impact of fisheries 
on the marine environment” was treated by the media. The subsequent media headlines 
included several doom and gloom forecasts of the sea areas around the UK, taken out of 
context and out of proportion. Media is a driver of dramatising environmental conflicts 
because it emphasises conflicts and extremism in order to sell their story. In this way they are 





 Adversarial governance will be the result of a system where two major political 
parties dominate the elections. This can lead to the opposition disagreeing with everything the 
government proposes for the sake of disagreeing and thus blocking for important decisions.  
(Wikipedia 2006 two-party system: http://en.wikipedia.org) The incentives will not be to 
generate opposing views but produce input that is for or against something, in other words 
extreme position-taking. In such, environment institutions may encourage disputes to start 
from the extremes, polarizing environmental conflicts more than necessary.  
 
Constitutional, statutory and administrative language 
 Political language can be vague and contradictory and combined with multiple and 
competing statutes can be drivers of conflicts, and sometimes conflicts can even be caused or 
maintained due to a particular law. This vagueness can for instance result in situations where 
the choice to either continue production or preserve areas or species is changed into a median 
resting place where management is intensified. If we introduce vague and changing 
management philosophies differing in interpretation depending on who includes them into the 
conflict areas, it is understandable that resolutions are not found. According to Nie 
“Ecosystem approach” is one example of such vague philosophies which have been 
superimposed on top of agency missions rather than replaced them. The vagueness of the 
Ecosystem Approach has resulted in application in terms of adjusting it to the already present 
policy and in this way adopting a new name for an old conduct. As Lynn Corn expressed it in 
her article from 1993 concerning amongst other things definition of ecosystems: “When 
nearly all of these disparate groups are advocating "ecosystem management" as a solution to 
current issues one thing is clear: there is not enough agreement on the meaning of this 
concept to hinder its popularity” (Corn 1993).  
 
Distrust: 
 Distrust is a driver of conflict because it plays a malignant part in the resolution 
processes undermining constructive debate and participation. Finding common approaches to 
problem solving may be undermined by distrust, which often is a result of previous policies 
and policy makers failing to hold what they promised. Distrust can also manifest itself in lack 




2.3. Conflict in political perspective 
 
 Nie ends his article by making a few points to help put natural resource-based 
conflicts in political perspective. First he says that conflicts are a sign that democracy is 
working and therefore must not be dreaded but expected in pluralistic democracies.  
But Nie wish to draw focus to the negative effect of some unhealthy, wicked conflicts. They 
can lead to for instance stalemate or pendulum swings between two extremes. Such pendulum 
swings can have harmful effects when conflicts are about ecological restoration and recovery 
of endangered species. Such conflicts can be difficult to stop, slow down or change direction 
of since the starting point often are the extreme and the harder one interest push the harder the 
other pulls.  
 The problem is to distinguish the healthy conflicts from the unhealthy ones and Nie 
lists some questions that can help us make the distinction. First it is important to analyse to 
find out weather the conflict is internally driven by competing human values or by external 
factors such as political institutions, processes, budgets and communication strategies that 
prevent the common interest from being realized. It is most likely driven by both, but the hope 
is that the latter outweigh the former because it is easier to negotiate governance than deep-
core human values. However, focusing on natural resource governance can help clarifying the 
central values, determine if they are compatible with others and what to do about it if they are 
not, even in value-based conflicts. 
 Secondly it is important to reveal the role of the manager and public administrator in 
the conflict. Sometimes their role is by default and can spring from conflict and decision 
avoidance, and it is important to make the administrators acknowledge these conflicts and not 
just either wishing them away, leaving it up to experts to come up with a resolution or push 
them aside as nefarious efforts of sabotage. Administrative leadership can be used to promote 
and facilitate constructive debates among governmental and non-governmental actors and 
constructive framing and reframing of conflicts.  
 Central to natural resource governance are political institutions and decision making 
processes, but political factors like electoral politics, wedge issues, media coverage and 
interest groups also play important parts. This implies that in order to fix what is wrong with 
natural resource governance the political-type drivers must be examined in addition to 
focusing on institutions, statutory mandates, administrative rulemaking and public law. 
Changes in politics may result in changes in governance. 
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 Thinking of conflict in terms of drivers may facilitate in finding the right resolution. 
Maybe we find that the conflict is driven primarily by questions of finance, and then we can 
focus on finding a budgetary configuration that is as mutually agreeable as possible. If there 
are legislative weaknesses we can focus on legislation, and if the conflict is largely about 
adversarial policy frames collaborative conservation strategies and increased public 
participation might help. If a conflict is driven primarily by scientific disagreement and 
uncertainty, the first step would be to ensure that the conflict really is science based and not 
just framed as such. If this is actually the case we can suggest applying some tools such as 
adaptive management strategies (with increased knowledge of resources and ecosystems as a 
common goal to use in adjusting and changing plans or approaches), civic science (in which 
stakeholders contribute to a pluralistic science that incorporates local knowledge directly into 
environmental decision making and research (Reed and McIlveen 2006) or collaborative 
monitoring. Each of these involving collaboration between stakeholders, managers and 
science. 
 If it is revealed and ensured that the conflict is value-based, it is best to go straight to 
the point of telling each other what we like and thus bring the debate to a solvable, concrete 

























Chapter 3. The Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan 
 
 
IN February 2004 Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004 of 26 February 2004 
establishing measures for the recovery of cod stocks was published. This represented the start 
of the Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan and introduced a system of closed area, technical 
conservation measures, effort restriction and new control measures that was to be 
implemented. The basis for this was a proposition from the Commission that presented 
propositions for the establishment of long-term recovery plans for a number of cod stocks 
threatened with collapse (Commission Proposal COM (2002) 773). The proposal was 
examined at the following Fisheries Council and was adopted and presented in the above 
mentioned regulation This regulation provided a common recipe for all the cod recovery 
programs of the EU, which included cod in the North Sea, where interim measures had been 
in place since 2001, cod to the West of Scotland and cod in the Kattegat. The Commission 
itself called the 2004 Recovery Plans the “first application of the reformed Fisheries Policy” 
because it included many of the main areas of reform 
But, some will argue that the recovery plan started already in 2000 and this is because 
interim emergency measures were implemented at this time, and continued to apply up until 
2004. These included reduction in TACs, closed area and technical measures. In 2004 these 
measures were put into a system, and coupled with effort restrictions and additional control 
measures into an official plan. This is why in this thesis the measures applied prior to 2004 
will be called temporary or interim recovery measures, while what happened from 2004 and 
on will be called The Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan or the Recovery Plan for short. This is 
according to information achieved from Council Regulations and is thus considered the 
correct application and it also follows the logic that if the interim measures would have 
worked, there would be no need to start a Recovery Plan. Very often in the literature there 
will be references to the entire period as the Cod Recovery Plan. It is however, necessary that 
the first three years after recovery measures were introduced is dealt with in this thesis firstly 
because they made quite an impact on the industry, secondly they made an impact on the 
Recovery Plan and thirdly because the same measures were maintained also after 2004. So, 





3.1. The area and its fisheries 
 
The Irish Sea is 103,600 sq km with a total volume of approximately 2,400 cubic km. 
It surrounds the Isle of Man and is itself surrounded by Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, 
England and Wales. It is relatively shallow,  less than 90m deep in most places with shallow 
sandbanks off the Irish and north-west English coasts and it connects to the Atlantic Ocean 
(the Celtic Sea) by St George's Channel between the Republic of Ireland and Wales to the 
south and by the North Channel between Northern Ireland and Scotland to the north-east. The 
length of the sea is 209 km and it is up to 230 km at the widest and 315 meters at the most 
narrow point (Beaufords dyke between Norhern Ireland and Scottland). 
The sea is of high economic importance to fishing, shipping and transport, regional 
trade and power generation in the form of nuclear plants (Wikipedia 2006 Irish 
Sea:http://en.wikipedia.org, HighBeam 2006 Irish Sea:http://www.encyclopedia.com). 
The fisheries include Nephrops (Norway lobster), cod, haddock, whiting, plaice, sole and ray 
and are conducted by boats from Ireland, Northern Ireland, England, Wales, Isle of Man, as 
well as Belgium, France and the Netherlands. The main types of gear used is otter trawl which 
is applied mainly in the western areas targeting nephrops, cod, whiting, haddock, ray and 
plaice and beam trawls targeting sole and plaice mostly in the eastern Irish Sea. The demersal 
species are the most important and they are caught in mixed fisheries with many stocks 
exploited together in different combinations. Most of the vessels target nephrops 
predominantly in the muddy areas west of the Isle of Man, either with single or twin rigged 
otter trawls. Bycatch from this fishery includes haddock, cod and plaice which is also landed 
and provides an important economic contribution to the prawn fishermen (whiting is also 
caught but discarded). Although the number of vessels has declined in recent years, the 
herring fishery is still the main pelagic fishery in the Irish Sea There is also fishing targeted 
directly at cod, haddock, whiting and plaice with commercially important bycatch such as 
anglerfish, hake and sole.  Recent studies show that the use of twin-rigs, which were first 
introduced in the 1990´s, increases the proportion of roundfish bycatch in Nephrops fisheries 
compared with single-rig otter trawl (ICES WGNSDS Report 2006)  
 Because the sea is towards the southern limit of the distribution of cod in the North 
Atlantic, the warmer waters provides rapid growth with fully maturing cod by the age of three. 
The value of the cod fishery in 2002 was about € 9 million, and the stock is important as a 
target or bycatch in many fisheries. Ireland, UK, France and Belgium all fish for cod in the 
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Irish Sea. In 2002 this comprised 32 fleets and the main catches by gear were: Midwater-
trawls – 64%, Nephrops trawls – 22% (bycatch), beam trawls – 7%, other gears – 7% 
(Codling and Kelly 2004) A Northern Irish semi-pelagic trawling for cod and whiting 
developed in the early 1980s, and as the availability of whiting declined this fleet switched to 
mainly targeting cod and haddock. (ICES WGNSDS report 2006)  The main fleets targeting 
cod include whitefish otter trawlers operating out of ports in Northern Ireland, England, 
Wales and Ireland, and midwater trawlers operating out of Northern Ireland. Midwater 
trawlers target spawning cod and haddock in spring, and cod, hake and haddock in summer 
and autumn in the deeper offshore waters. Twin trawling increased during the 1990s mostly in 
the western Irish Sea but also some in the North Channel and Clyde. These vessels target 
either Nephrops or cod and haddock. The vessels fishing Nephrops also take cod as a by-catch.  
As the prawn boats drag their nets along the muddy bottom of the Irish Sea, cod are scooped 
up along with the nephrops. Some French trawlers operating mainly in the Celtic Sea extend 
their activities into the Southern parts of the Irish Sea fishing for cod. Vessels from Northern 
Ireland fish mainly in the western Irish Sea, but about one forth of the effort is directed to the 
North Channel and Clyde (VIa/VIIa boundary). Effort is highest in spring, when cod is easily 
available. Irish whitefish vessels fish mainly in the western Irish Sea and the St George’s 
channel, and the majority of Irish vessels presently target Nephrops. The English and Welsh 
whitefish fleets operate mainly in the inshore waters of the eastern Irish Sea where mixed 
demersal species (plaice, cod, rays) are targeted depending upon availability and season, but 
this fleet declined substantially through the 1990s. A high fraction of the cod catch of this 
fleet comprises immature cod. Belgian, Irish, English and Welsh beam trawlers targeting sole 
and plaice in the eastern Irish Sea and off the Isle of Man in addition to single-rig Nephrop 
trawlers from Northern and Southern Ireland fishing in the western parts have by-catches of 
cod.  Tagging studies (England and Wales in 1970´s and 1980´s, and Ireland in 1990´s) show 
that although limited movement of cod between the western and eastern parts occurs, a major 
southwards movement of adult cod takes place seasonally from spawning grounds in the 
western parts. Some fish move as far as the Celtic sea (ICES ACFM Report 2003)  
 The Irish Sea is under CFP management and is by this undertaken the management 
schemes and measures introduced (Sustainable fisheries through Regional Management, 
2000). This includes TACs and minimum landing size and mesh size restrictions For 2006 the 
TAC and the allocations were according to table 1 below: 
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Figure 2: History of fishing mortality of Irish Sea cod 
(From: Council Regulation N0 51/2006 of December 2005) 
TAC Belgium France Ireland The Netherlands United Kingdom 
1 282 tonnes 24 tonnes 67 tonnes 1 204 tonnes 6 tonnes 527 tonnes 
Table 1: The cod TAC and the allocation of the ICES division VIIa, Irish Sea 
 
3.2. The state of the cod stock  
  The Stock Books of the Fisheries Science Services of the Marine Institute of Ireland 
for 2004 and 2005 (The stock book 2005) paints a gloomy picture of the state of the Irish Sea 
cod stock. SSB is said to be under Blim, recent recruitment is estimated to be the lowest ever 
and F is above Flim. In other words this stock is not harvested sustainable according to the 
scientists. This is far from being a new development since already in December 1999 the 
European Council adopted a drastic reduction in the Irish Sea cod TAC based on warnings 
from ICES in November 1999 on the detrimental state of the stock. ICES have been calling 
out warnings concerning this stock every year since,  and there is little doubt within the 
scientific world that Irish Sea cod is, and has been for quite some time, overfished. 
 According to figures taken from the Stock Book of 2005, the spawning stock biomass 
has been gradually reduced since the late 80s (See figure 3.2), while the fishing mortality 
shows a gradual increase in the same time period (se figure 3.1). Recruitment has been very 
low since 2002 (see figure 3.4) and the total removals have been estimated to be above the 
TACs from 2000 to 2004 (See figure 3.3, no record for 2005 and 2006). The spawning stock 
biomass of this particular stock is below Bpa and has been below Blim  since 1995 while fishing 






Figure 3 : History of spawning stock biomass of Irish Sea cod 
Figure 4 : History of landings and TACs for the latest 18 years  
 Figure 5 : History of recruitment Irish Sea cod
(all figures taken from the Stock Book 2005) 
 Based on the bleak prognosis on the cod stock of the Irish Sea in 1999, interim 
emergency measures were established for the fishery on this stock in January 2000. This 
marked the very beginning of recovery programs within the EU, and the proceeding year 
emergency measures were applied to the cod fishery of the North Sea as well well (The 





3.3. Interim measures and the Cod Recovery Plan as they appear on paper 
  
Total Allowable Catch   
 The main thrust of the first emergency measures implemented in 2000 included a 
large reduction in the TAC coupled with closed areas and technical conservation measures. In 
order to reveal the history of TACs and quotas we need to go back to 1983 when they were 
included in the CFP as a basis for the allocation of quotas among the nations. TACs and 
quotas are what we call output control measures, designed to regulate the amount of fish taken 
out of the sea. The TACs are decided upon according to the maximum quantity of fish that 
scientists have assessed can be caught from a specific stock (The Stock Book 2005). For the 
EU ICES is where they get this information and once the TACs and quotas are decided each 
Member State is in charge of distributing the quotas to the vessels. Quota means the State’s 
share of the TAC fixed by the Council relating to certain species each subsequent year 
National quotas are divided into quarterly quotas, which secure a spread of fishing activities 
over the year. These quotas are allocated to individual vessels through rations for a given 
period. All fishermen who are entitled to fish have a right to such a ration, which is not 
transferable. The amount of the ration depends on the number of fishermen that participates in 
a specific fishery (Shepherd 2003). 
 The allocation of the TACs between member states happens according to the Principle 
of Relative Stability which is based on using historical fishing tradition in deciding a certain 
percentage of the annual TAC for each fishing nation of the EU (Morin 2000). The principle 
still pertains in spite of reoccurring debates concerning its future application.  Article 4 of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83 of 25 January 1983 states that: “The volume of the 
catches available to the Community referred to in Article 3 shall be distributed between the 
Member States in a manner which assures each Member State relative stability of fishing 
activities for each of the stocks considered.” Consequently, each member state was to retain a 
fixed percentage determined with reference to the base years between 1973 and 1978 (Debate 
in the Parliament of Ireland 2002: http://www.irlgov) The incentive of the principle was to 
safeguard the particular needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on 
fisheries and related industries, a commitment to stability in the allocation of fishing rights 
(quotas) among Member States (Council Regulation (EEC) No 172/83 ).The Spanish and 
Portuguese applications for memberships to the EU, is probably what encouraged the 
construction of the Principle. Because if accepted they would bring with them the largest 
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fishing fleets of Europe and the fear of having Spanish and Portuguese efficient fishing fleet 












Reducing the TACs 
 Returning to 1999 and cod in the Irish Sea, scientists from ICES had recommended 
the lowest possible fishing effort, but as mixed fisheries necessarily has by-catches of cod a 
certain amount had to be allowed fished to keep discards to a minimum. The Council fixed a 
TAC of 2,100 tonnes for 2000 as compared to 5,500 tonnes in 1999 in other words a more 
than 50% reduction (see table 2)   
 The result of the reduced TACs was felt primarily in Northern Ireland since they were 
more dependent on  the cod. This comes forth in a BBC News Online article from 17 
December 1999 which states that the Irish Sea cod quota was cut by 62% while cod quota of 
the North Sea was cut by 39%. In the same article one can read: “A number of Northern Irish 
trawlermen are reported to be on the verge of giving up fishing following the cuts which will 
almost entirely eliminate catches of white fish species such as cod. “ The same article 
suggests that many fishermen had been waiting for this news in order to decide weather to 
stay in or leave the industry because of previous cuts in quotas. The nephrops quota was also 
proposed to be cut, but Northern Ireland’s agriculture and fisheries minister at that time, Brid 
Rodgers succeeded in reducing the cuts. She emphasised the importance of having someone 
from Northern Ireland present at the negotiations, someone explaining how difficult the 
situation was for them (BBC news online 17 December 1999: http://news.bbc.co.uk). This 






Estimated landings Nominal catch/ official 
landings 
1999 5,500 tonnes 4,780 tonnes 2,960 tonnes 
2000 2,100 tonnes 2,190 tonnes 1,417 tonnes 
2001 2,100 tonnes 3,875 tonnes 2,026 tonnes 
2002 3,200 tonnes 4,420 tonnes 2,708 tonnes 
2003 1,950 tonnes n/a 1,457 tonnes 
Table 2: TACs and landings from 1999 to 2003
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  The following year, 2000, the reduced TACs were put into a system of temporary 
recovery measures together with closed area and technical measures which prevailed for three 
years with some modifications.  
 
TACs involved in the recovery system and harvest control rules 
 In 2003 a new course was plotted as the reform of the CFP promised strict 
management for stocks in danger with long-term setting of TACs as part of the plan. 
Measures would be taken within the framework of a long-term strategy with estimated time 
frame of 5 to 10 years for achieving the recovery objectives. Propositions for such a long.term 
cod recovery plan were presented in an amended proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing measures for the recovery of cod and hake stocks (Commission Proposal 
(2002)773) . The measures were to be imposed on the following fish stocks: Cod in the 
Kattegat, the North Sea, Skagerrak and the Eastern Channel, cod to the west of Scotland, cod 
in the Irish Sea and hake in the Northern area (hereafter referred to as the Cod Recovery 
Zone). This is an important point to consider because from this time on measures were no 
longer tailored for the Irish Sea but one and the same system was to be applied to all the 
depleted cod stocks of the EU.  
 For these stocks a TAC was to be decided upon each year directed at a 30% increase 
in the cod stock at the end of the year compared to the beginning of the year. This TAC was 
not to be more or less than 15% different in either direction from that of the previous year and 
a certain fishing mortality target was to be the basis for its decision. For the Irish Sea the 
fishing mortality rate to be targeted was 0,72, while if the quantity of mature fish was to fall 
below a certain number, the fishing mortality should be drastically reduced (See Appendix I, 
table A) But a fishing mortality rate of 0.72 is quite high, at least compared to other cod 
stocks under similar conditions around the world (Rosenberg and Mogensen 2005). This is 
also the stock with the highest mortality rate in the Cod Recovery Zone, with the North Sea 
cod at 0.62 (Appendix I table A). The intention of such a system was to set a TAC that makes 
it probable that the amount of fish at the end of each year is higher than it was at the 
beginning of each year. This implies that the fishing mortality rate will vary from year to year 
(Information Sheet No 1: http://www.scottishfishermen ) In cases like this where recovery 
plans have been modified to include rules on how the TACs will be set in the years before 
recovery has been achieved they have come to be called Harvest Control Rules (HCR) (The 
Stock book: 2005).  However, the cod TAC of 2004 was 2,100 tons, which means an increase 
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from the 2003 TAC of 1,950 tons. In other words the new way of setting the TACs resulted in 
an increase. The cod TAC agreed for 2005 was the same as for 2004.  
(Kelley et al 2006, Rosenberg and Mogensen 2005) 
 In February 2003 as scientists came to the ports in Northern Ireland they were met by 
angry fishermen who denied the scientists access to the catch.  According to the scientists 
they missed out on valuable information in order to make a justifiable assessment of the fish 
stocks (Report on the ANIFPO Workshop 2003:http://www.mmedia.is).  
 
The Hague Preference 
 Before we leave the TAC´s and quotas let us take a look at a part of the Principle of 
Relative Stability called “the Hague preference”  which gives derogations to Ireland and UK 
in cases when quotas for certain stocks fall below determined trigger levels (House of 
Commons, UK Parliament 2004 Column 1220W:http://www.publications.parliament.uk). 
The origin of this agreement lies back in 1976 when Ireland agreed to the EU declaring 200-
mile fishing zone around the Irish coast. It recognised the underdeveloped state of the fishing 
industry and the fact that a large burden was put on Ireland in the control of its EEZ that was 
not proportionate to the benefits the sector provided. The same accounted for some parts of 
the UK. The Hague Preference is to be found in Annex VII to a document referred to as the 
“Hague Resolution” (Resolution of 3 November 1976). The annex is a secret document which 
has not been published and its legal validity has been questioned  But apparently Ireland 
should be ensured a doubling of its 1975 catch (representing 6 954 tonnes of cod and 7 196 
tonnes of whiting) and the United Kingdom catches of a volume equivalent to that of landings 
in 1975 by vessels of less than 24 metres in its northern regions, in the Irish Sea the 'Hague 
Preference' system represents 1 223 tonnes of cod and 2 334 tonnes of whiting for the United 
Kingdom  (Court of Justice of the European Communities 1998: http://www.worldlii.org/eu, 
Parliament of Ireland 2002: http://www.irlgov.ie, UK Parliament, House of Commons 2002 
Column 17W: http://www.europarl.tory.org.uk) In other words the Hague Preference secures 
Ireland and UK a minimum amount of fish at times when stocks are low and this also means 
that they have a minimum fleet size below which they do not need to reduce further. This is 
fulfilled at the expense of the other states fishing in the areas surrounding these States. As 
long as the TACs and quotas were high this was not a problem but since 1989 they have been 
low and Ireland and UK have invoked the Hague Preference. Under such circumstances 
Ireland and the United Kingdom are granted annual quotas calculated on the basis of the mid-
point between the notional quotas resulting from the application of the 1983 allocation keys 
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alone and the notional quotas corresponding to their Hague Preferences. According to a 
review of fisheries Issues in Northern Ireland from 1993 The Republic of Ireland has always 
been a net gainer by this process as has England, while Northern Ireland has been a net looser 
something which has caused great frustration among Northern Irish fishermen (Northern 
Ireland Forum for Political Dialogue 1996:http://www.niforum.gov.uk). Barrie Deas said 
during his telephone interview that the UK has tried to compensate the effect of the Hague 
preference upon the Northern Irish fishermen by swapping quotas for other species for cod.   
 
 Closed areas and technical conservation measures 
 
 Closure of the estimated cod spawning ground of the Irish Sea together with technical 
measures was implemented in 2000 and followed up and adjusted in 2001 and 2002, aiming at 
maximum possible protection during the spawning season and to maximize egg production of 
the existing stock (Kelly et al 2006).  There were derogations from the first year on for fishing 
Nephrops in the closed area because of socio-economic concerns and the notion that this 
fishery was unlikely to have a significant negative impact on the cod (Kelly et al 2006, 
Scottish Executive: Press Releases 2000: http://www.scotland.gov). The consecutive years 
more derogation was pushed for, resulting in a quite complicated, heavy body of instructions. 
The details and maps of the closed area and technical measures for 2000 until 2003 are given 
in Table B and C of Appendix II.The revised closed area for protecting the spawning stock 
and the technical measures have been maintained also after 2003 but the latter was then 
attached to the Days at Sea regime in addition to the closed area. The minimum landing size 





 Since 1 February 2003 fishing effort limitations (days at sea restrictions) have been 
introduced to the cod fishery of the Skagerrak, Kattegat, the North Sea and west of Scotland 
(Annex XVII of Council Regulation (EC) No 2341/2002). In 2004 the Irish Sea and eastern 
Channel cod fishery was included in the effort restrictions which were now part of the official 
Recovery Plan, and the same measures applied to all the areas (For details see  Table D, 
Appendix III). Each year, the Council were to decide by a qualified majority, on adjustments 
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to the number of fishing days in direct proportion to the application of the TACs (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 423/2004) The reduction in effort was to be distributed throughout the 
Community according to historic fishing data from a three year reference period.  Article 9 of 
a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing measures for the recovery of cod stocks 
(Commission Proposal (2003) 237) under chapter IV “Fishing Effort Limitations” the 
establishment and composition of such a data base is addressed. It states that for any vessel 
flying the flag of or registered within the Community which has landed any quantity of cod, 
sandeel or Norway pout in the three year reference period 2000, 2001 and 2002 in the 
following areas: Kattegat, North Sea, Skagerrak, Eastern Channel, Irish Sea and West of 
Scotland shall establish a data base containing the following information: Name and internal 
registration number of vessel; installed engine power of the vessel in kilowatts (measured in 
accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86); the number of days absent from 
port; the quantity of cod landed in tons; the quantity of sandeel landed in tons; the quantity of 
Norway pout landed in tons; the kilowatt-days as the product of the number of days absent 
from port, the installed engine power in kilowatts and average fishing effort during the 
reference period. This data base was to be the reference from which days at sea could be 
allocated. 
  In the Irish Sea, temporary closing of an area during the cod spawning period was 
maintained and in 2004 the reduced fishing mortality was to be compensated for in terms of 
additional days for certain gears. The specific measures of this effort regime were given in 
Annex V of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2287/2003 of 19 December 2003 fixing for 2004 
the fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks and groups of fish 
stocks, applicable in Community waters and, for Community vessels, in waters where catch 
limitations are required (Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004). All vessels of 10 metres or 
more in overall length carrying certain gears in the Cod Recovery Zone were subject to limits 
on the number of days they could spend at sea (Effort Control Measures 2005: 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk) The Days at Sea instructions for 2005 were given in Annex IV of 
Council regulation (EC) No 27/2005, and differed slightly from those of 2004. The main 
difference was that there was an overall reduction in the number of days for almost all of the 
gear-classes. Several instructions are included in this measure and the details are provided in 
the list below.  The allocated days and the derogations for the different gear types are given in 
Table E, Appendix III.  
 Annex IIa of Council Regulation (EC) No 51/2006 provides the effort control regime 
for 2006. This time the gear is classified in much more detail and so there are more gear 
 37
classes and a higher degree of quibbling. The derogations are no longer derogations but 
included in the list as categories, so the list comprises 35 different ones.  It is therefore no 
longer directly comparable to the previous instructions. Another obvious difference is that it is 
no longer the number of days per month but the number of days per year that is presented 
 In order to see some trends I have compared a few categories (those that I could be 
sure was the same) from 2004, 2005 and 2006 and divided the number of days per year for 
2006 by 12 months (see Table 3). The result shows that that the days for almost all these 




Table 3: Comparison of days at sea for the main gear categories for 2004, 2005 and 2006 
Gear category Days pr month 2004 Days per month 2005 Days per month 2006 
Demersal trawl, seines or 
similar towed gears of 
mesh size equal to or less 








Beam trawls of mesh size 
equal to or greater than 
80 mm 
14 13 11.9 
Static demersal nets 
including gill nets, 








Demersal longlines 17 16 14.42 
trawls, seines or similar 
towed gears of mesh size 
between 70 mm and 90 
mm (99mm in 2005) 
except beam trawls with 
mesh size between 80 mm 







demersal trawls, seines 
or similar towed gears of 
mesh size between 16 mm 








(Annex V of the Council Regulation (EC) No 2287/2003, Annex IVa of COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 27/2005, Annex IIa of 








Compliance, control and surveillance 
 
 In the Commission proposal for a Council regulation establishing measures for the 
recovery of cod stocks from 2003, specific monitoring, inspection and surveillance measures 
are presented for the cod recovery plans. This was followed up by Council Regulation No 
423/2004. The measures involve fishing effort messages, prior notification, designated ports, 
separate stowage of cod, transport of cod and specific monitoring programs. The vessels for 
which these measures apply are the ones included in the lists of Article 9 of the proposition 
which deals with the establishment and composition of the data base (the same data base 
referred to under the “effort restriction part”) The next article (Article 10) opens up for 
Member States to implement alternative control measures to ensure compliance with reporting 
obligations provided they are as effective and transparent as the above mentioned ( For 
background information see Appendix IV) 
 In Article 11 you can read that the master of a vessel shall 4 hours in advance of entry 
give the name of the port or landing location, the estimated time of arrival and the quantities 
in kg live weight of all species of which more than 50 kg is retained on board, to the 
competent authorities of the Member State, if it carries more than one ton of cod on board. 
The authorities may require that the discharge of catch retained on board a vessel carrying 
more than one ton of cod, shall not begin until authorized. If the master of a vessel wishes to 
tranship or discharge at sea any quantity landed on board, or to land in a third country shall 
inform the competent authorities of the flag Member State at least 24 hours in advance of the 
above mentioned information.  
 Landings of more than two tons of cod are addressed in Article 12, and this should be 
made only at designated ports and each Member State shall designate ports for this objective. 
A list of such designated ports should be transmitted to the Commission together with 
associated inspection and surveillance procedures including the terms and conditions for 
recording and reporting the quantities of cod within each landing.  
The normal margin of tolerance in the estimation of quantities in kg retained on board is 
according to Article 5(2) of Commission Regulation No 2807/83, 20%. Article 13 comes with 
derogation from this rule and states that in these recovery circumstances the margin of 
tolerance shall be 8%.  
 According to Article 14 it shall be prohibited to retain on board a Community fishing 
vessel in any container any quantity of cod mixed with other species of marine organisms. 
Containers with cod shall be kept separate from other containers. The next Article deals with 
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transport of cod and how the competent authorities of a Member State may require that any 
quantity of cod landed in that Member State shall be weighed in the presence of controllers 
before being transported elsewhere.   
 Transport of cod is addressed in Article 15, and the authorities of a Member State of 
first landing may require that any quantity of cod landed in the actual areas are weighed in the 
presence of controllers before transported elsewhere. If more than two tons of cod is landed at 
designated ports (Article 12), at least 20 % of the landings shall be weighed under supervision 
before being sold. The Member States must submit to the Commission details of the sampling 
regime. In addition must all quantities of cod greater than 50 kg which are transported to a 
place other than that of first landing or import shall be followed by a declaration indicating 
the quantities landed of each species and the area where they were caught, as a minimum. 
This is by way of derogation from Article 13 of Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 in which all 
processed or unprocessed fisheries products transported to a place other than that of landing 
or import, and for which neither a sales note or a take-over declaration has been submitted 
shall be accompanied by a document including certain pieces of information. Article 13 (4)(b) 
gives an exception to this rule, but for the Cod Recover Zone this exception does not apply.  
 The final Article (16) of the Regulation deals with a derogation to Article 34c(1) of 
the Regulation which addresses specific monitoring programs which can be laid on some 
fisheries involving two or more Member States. The Commission together with the 
Committee for Fisheries and Aquaculture and the Member States concerned shall decide on 
the conditions for such a program and which fisheries should be subject to it. These programs 
are not to last longer than two years, but the derogation for the cod recovery zones eliminate 
this time limit.  
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation 
and exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy is an important 
document published in the wake of the reform of the CFP. It gives directions on how to deal 
with different aspects of fisheries with a reference to sustainability and conservation of the 
resource. In Article 23 which deals with the responsibilities of the Member States it is 
emphasized that it is the responsibility of the Member State to control activities carried out in 
their territory. It also says however that Member States are required to ensure effective control, 
inspection and enforcement of the rules of the common fisheries policy also in cooperation 
with each other and with third countries. It is not an easy task and in order to facilitate this 
part a Community Fisheries Control Agency is under establishment according to Council 
Regulation (EC) No 768/2005). A Community agency is according to EUs own web-page 
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“Europa,” a body governed by European public law. It has its own legal personality and is to 
be kept apart from Community Institutions such as the Council, Parliament, Commission, etc. 
It is set up in the framework of the European Union’s “first pillar” which concerns economic, 
social and environmental policies and aims at accomplishing a very specific technical, 
scientific or managerial task. In this particular case its main tasks are to organise operational 
coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by the EU Member States and to 
assist them to cooperate in order to ensure compliance with the rules of the Common Fisheries 
Policy and their effective and uniform application. The Agency is still under preparation and 




In retrospect the decommissioning programmes of the CFP have all failed and one 
overriding reason is that the reduction targets have been too low, something that has been 
pushed forth by the industry of the individual Member States. Weak and confusing objectives 
led to abuse of the programmes to renew the fleet and get rid of old vessels for instance or 
relocate old vessels to other areas where fishing pressure may also have been high. The end of 
MAGP IV was also the end of the Multiannual Guidance Programmes, which were scrapped 
under the reform of the CFP (For background information on MAGP, see Appendix V). 
Unfortunately nothing replaced this and instead each Member State was given a certain 
capacity limit which it should not exceed according to Aticle 7 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2792/1999. This concludes a short review of the history of the effort to balance fishing 
capacity with fish availability within the CFP which is includeded in order to get an idea of 
what obstacles the CFP are facing.  
 Although fishing effort reduction schemes are not a direct part of the Cod Recovery 
Measures, they are included under “Effort Reduction.”  Member States are encouraged to 
decommission according to Council Regulation (EC) No 2792/1999, in which case they will 
be rewarded with additional days of fishing (Annex V of Council Regulation (EC) No 
2287/2003, Annex IVa of Council regulation (EC) No 27/2005, Annex IIa of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 51/2006)  
 In December 2002 a Council Regulation establishing emergency measures for 
scrapping fishing vessels was launched. This Regulation opened up for member states to 
apply for additional financial contribution for their decommissioning schemes for 2003. 
According to Article 7 of this Regulation the necessary funds for further financing of 
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emergency scrapping of vessels were to be made available for the years 2004 to 2006 by 
reprogramming of some structural funds. So far I have found no papers supporting this and it 
has nor been addressed under the decommissioning measures for the Recovery Plans.  
 According to the stock book of 2005 one decommissioning scheme in 2001 removed 
29 Northern Irish nephrops and whitefish vessels, and 4 English and Welsh vessels registered 
in Irish Sea ports. In 2003 another round of decommissioning resulted in permanent removal 
of 19 UK vessels representing 9, 3 % of the effort in tonnage.  
  An increased percentage of EU funding (20%) will be available for decommissioning; 
however, this aid will only become available where recovery plans call for a 25% or greater 
effort reduction. Hopefully this measure will prove to be an incentive for decommissioning 
























Chapter 4. Interim measures and Recovery Plan in public 
and political perspective 
 
 
In a press release from the Department of Communications, Marines and Natural 
resources of Ireland one can read that the first phase of a Stock recovery program for cod has 
been agreed upon 11th of February 2000 at the December EU Fisheries Council after 
negotiations between the EU Commission, fishing representatives and fisheries officials from 
Dublin, Belfast and London in addition to Belgium and France. The words of the, at that time 
Minister of this Department, Frank Fahey on the matter was: "this is a ground breaking 
initiative which has been drawn up in partnership with our fishermen. The co-operative 
approach resulted in a practical initiative that will have long term benefit for fishermen". 
"This important initiative will protect the spawning cod stock in the Irish Sea and will 
doubtless show the way to achieve effective conservation measures for other stocks which are 
under pressure. I am sure that fishermen will recognise the long term benefits of this 
approach", he added. (Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources 2000: 
http://www.dcmnr.gov). The already mentioned interim measures were followed up and 
adjusted in 2001, 2002 and 2003.  
 
4.1 Why the needs of a Recovery plan? 
 
 Ciaran Kelly started his interview by explaining the situation when the Recovery Plan 
was called for: “In 1990 the stock began to drop, and the advised TACs and landings began to 
drop. The TACs were lowered. The relationship within the stock was different, not as high 
recruitment. In 1996-97 and 98 there was a feeling of stability in the stock. But scientists say 
this is a dangerous situation because the recruitment is so low. The first year of the plan was 
2000 and the advice was zero catch. The recruitment dynamics were so low, and the stock 
was suffering from many years with low recruitment. Something drastic needed to be done 
and this is why we came to the Recovery Plan situation. The industry and mangers realised 
they needed to come up with some plan because the scientists were actually suggesting 
closing down the fishery.” He also said that part of the reason in his opinion could be that 
science used to be quite arrogant. Particularly fisheries science which used to give advice in a 
deterministic, unequivocal fashion, based on assessments and presented to the industry in 
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terms of a specific number of the stocks. He also said that the level of precision with which 
the scientists gave advice in the past and the precision of potential impact of catch at different 
levels did not reflect the level of uncertainty. Based on this he could understand if people had 
lost confidence in science, and commented “so those levels of precision were based on 
assumptions that the figures we were dealing with were as precise as we were treating them.”  
He also mentioned that a lot was based on assumption for instance that the natural mortality 
was assumed to be 0,2, and pointed to the problem if an increase in natural mortality should 
occur which would be pinned on fishing mortality because natural mortality was treated as a 
constant. “Scientists were like this: you look at a sample of the world and you think this is it, 
you sample the world. “ He continued by saying that medium distribution of possibilities is 
good enough to manage from when the stock is good, but when stocks move into a situation 
of less productivity, there is a problem because the medium has a distribution around it: “you 
want to find Bpa, and looking at the medium will not actually be where you are,” he 
concluded.  
 The problem for the stock intensified as managers did not follow the advices given by 
the scientists, and when in addition the unreported catch and bycatch was presumably much 
higher than the official numbers indicated. Discards are not included in the estimates of 
fishing mortality and abundance because discard data is not required within the CFP. So, the 
stock may well have been overestimated (Rosenberg and Mogensen 2005). One of the well 
known problems of quota management is that when quotas are exhausted for fish caught as 
bycatch, this fish that could have otherwise been sold is being discarded (Shepherd 2003).  
 Ciaran Kelly explained that although the idea of recovery plans is new, it may just be 
another labelling of a situation that has occurred in the past. It is a new way of formalising 
structures of communication between managers, scientists and the industry. 
 
4.2. Output control: The social circumstances of TACs and the reduction of quotas 
 
 The management of fisheries within the European Union as already mentioned, is 
based on TACs which are decided for each stock for each year. Weather this is a successful 
system or not, is under constant debate. According to the above mentioned article by J.G. 
Shepherd 2003, managing stocks based on TACs and quotas presents certain difficulties 
including the need for accurate scientific assessment of the stocks that also track fluctuations, 
accurate reporting and registration of catches (without under- or misreporting) and efficient 
enforcement when quotas are exhausted. These are extremely costly operations that will only 
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add up for the most important commercial stocks (J.G. Shepherd 2003). According to the 
scientists themselves, the assessments are unreliable and not able to take into account 
predictions. Dominic Rihan of the BIM said this about the TACs in general: “No one except 
the French think the quota system works. I think it is time for fundamental change.” In his 
opinion the present system is too complex and has too many layers because people are putting 
scientific, political, economic, social and technical aspects into the equation which eventually 
are irrelevant. Patricia Comiskey remarked that the current system does not encourage good 
data collection because it is based on an attacking quota system where you are penalised if 
you get over your catch: “It does not encourage people to give the right. The French have 
problems catching their quotas, and they do not want to show this. If you catch less you will 
be reduced next year if you show this if you catch more, you will be penalised,” she 
concluded. Lorcan Ó Cennéide touched upon one of these preconditions when commenting on 
the cod fishery of the Irish Sea:  “…Commission proposes (good people in the commission). 
Those proposals are then the subject of a whole political horse trading, science goes off the 
table fairly early. It drives me nuts to go to all the meetings. People are talking bullshit and 
they know that. We have a serious problem of underreporting, let’s be honest about it. We 
need a discussion on what is the reason for this. Is the answer more control more enforcement. 
System failure, miscalculation. Or else the states of the quotas and tax is unrealistic or 
fishermen are greedy. But we need a useful discussion” The problem is that increasingly 
restrictive TACs imposed on the fishing industry have presumably led to misreporting, and 
consequently the scientists do not know how many fish have been landed. This leads to a 
vicious circle where negative biases in the catch data result in low stock abundance estimates 
by scientists leading to even lower TACs and finally even more misreporting (Beare et al 
2005). In other words the low quotas inspire to a higher degree of underreporting which 
counteracts, and maybe evens out the effect of reduced quotas. When situations like the 
Northern Irish fishermen denying scientist access to the catch occurs, the accurate reporting 
and registration of catches is of course a lost cause. This was an act of opposition because of 
increasingly lowered TACs, and must be regarded as the result of a lot of frustration caused 
by the feeling of being unjustly treated, of not being listened to and of not being able to debate 
the decisions. Ciaran Kelly explained the situation like this: “there was a lot of acrimony 
around the plan because there had been very little though about what the fleet would do. 
Everything was concentrated around saving the cod. People felt they were penalised and the 
industry began to withdraw cooperation. In Northern Ireland the scientists got opposition 
because the industry felt that the scientists had led them into this situation and thus could not 
 45
be trusted anymore. The result was increased uncertainty in the assessments because data 
was becoming sparse. If you think that in order to be able to measure the outtake of the stock 
we need to be able to measure the length frequency distribution and the age-length 
distribution of the catch. If the catch is 5000 tonnes and you are measuring 500 tonnes you 
have a reasonable chance of accurate measurements. If landings are reduced and you are 
only measuring 50 tonnes…as you reduce sample size, you get less and less precise version of 
the overall state of the stock. First of all being able to estimate the age distribution…. 
normally the scientists would go down to the fishing boats but they were not allowed, in 
Northern Ireland primarily. That is one element of uncertainty but not the whole. If people do 
not declare the landings and underreporting......combinations of those factors have led to the 
assessment becoming less and less certain because the scientists do not know the actual 
catch.” He continued by explaining the two methods of assessing the stock where one is 
fisheries dependent based on reported landings, discards etc and the other is through stock 
assessment surveys. But as stock size shrink you have the same problem with the surveys as 
with the fisheries dependent because you do not get a high degree of accuracy. Incorporated 
in the TAC system is the Precautionary Approach. In practice this means that warnings are 
expressed a while before the critical downward limit of a stock is reached and it represents a 
concrete limit as to what can be considered sustainable or non-sustainable fishing. This is a 
good example of the precautionary approach being put into practical use. But, there are 
problems concerning the application of the approach and they lie in the nature of it. First of all 
some say it will only lead to even greater uncertainty into the advices from ICES. And 
increased uncertainty leads to decreased confidence. The definition of the precautionary 
approach is vague and as already mentioned critics claim that it sets out to take action based 
on what we do not know instead of what we do know (Guldberg 2003). Ciaran Kelly said this 
about the approach: “The Precautionary Approachis based on the precautionary principle, 
they redefined the principle to an approach. And the principle said that we should avoid 
undesirable outcome. They defined an undesirable outcome purely from the point of view of 
the fish stock and not from the point of view of people living from this. You need to redefine 
what is an undesirable outcome,” In my opinion there is a possibility that the approach 
actually counteracts its purpose since there might be suspicion that the warning of crisis about 
overfished stocks may be expressed before the actual crisis is a fact and therefore people get 
the notion of a time lag before they need to take action. Lorcan Ó Cinnéide commented during 
his interview on the Precautionary Approach: “The PA says when we don’t have the 
information---you die. The tools for measuring and managing the Irish Sea exist, high degree 
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of knowledge of the Irish Sea. Application of the PA, is we have poor data and we apply the 
PA. This is not acceptable. It should be we will make every effort to try and make sure that the 
data is as reliable as possible!” Joe Maddock consented to this and said that what fishermen 
argue strongly against is that there is not enough information about the stock. “PA, that drives 
the fishers crazy.” 
 Another theory that influences the setting of the TAC is the ecosystem approach 
which requires a holistic way of thinking about harvested resources and their ecosystems. 
Within this principle lies the notion that management should act in conduct with the species 
that is most threatened. In this particular case when we are dealing with a mixed fishery, the 
fishery for other species ends when the cod quota is fished in order to avoid bycatch of cod. 
Ciaran Kelly had strong doubts about including ecosystem approach into the present 
management system: “I can see that it makes sense to embrace the fact that these species do 
not live in isolation. But weather you can micromanage stocks on the basis of TACs and 
quotas as we have in an ecosystem context…I have great doubts as to weather that is possible. 
I think you have to move t o a different management paradigm, you have to begin to look at 
exploiting stocks sin a much different context. For instance we spent a lot of time in the past 
looking at concepts such as MSY thinking it is achievable. It is not. If environment is changing 
than MSY is changing, and anyway we cannot even measure the productivity of the stock with 
enough precision to actually say exactly what happens to the MSY. We can say it when we 
have passed it but by that time it may be too late”. Dominic Rihan shared his view on this 
approach: “a lot of European regulations are driven by cod. Huge issue. Irish Sea is totally 
different to the North Sea, yet always the commission has used the cod conservation of the 
North Sea. It cannot be done like this.”  Lorcan consents to this by saying that: “The focus on 
cod being the measure for all fisheries management, the lowest common denominator for 
management. Might as well do woodoo” he concluded. It is clear from looking at the TACs of 
other fished species of the Irish Sea. When the cod quota is taken the fishery for other species 
ends (WWF Tuesday 21 October 2003: http://www). For cod in 2004 for instance, the advice 
from ICES was for zero catch until SSB had been rebuilt above Blim. They also 
recommended that only demersal fisheries which can demonstrate that they fish without catch 
or discards of cod and whiting may be permitted in order to include the characteristics of 
mixed fisheries. ICES also stated that: “unless ways can be found to harvest species caught in 
mixed fisheries within precautionary limits for all those species individually then fishing 
should not be permitted” (ICES WGNSDS report 2005 http://www.ices). Although the result 
has not been zero catch, reduced quotas on haddock and whiting is an example of effectuating 
 47
the Ecosystem Approach. For the fishermen this may appear as an extremely irrational 
procedure since they see a lot of for instance haddock but they cannot fish it. For a long time 
the nephrops quotas were not reduced, in spite of the fact that cod is a bycatch here. But the 
threat above all for Northern Ireland in particular, is if the nephrops quota is attacked. Cod is 
valuable for the Northern Irish industry but it makes up less than £1.4m Northern Ireland 
boats land about 450 tonnes each year. By contrast, the prawn catch is huge and is worth more 
than £10m each year. Prawn landings total 5,000 tonnes and help sustain many of Northern 
Ireland's 150 boats (BBC News Friday, 25 October 2002:http://news.bbc.co.uk/). The 
practical obstacles to ecosystem management were addressed in a debate in the House of 
Commons where this question was posed to the fisheries minister in 2004: “First, fisheries 
scientists now estimate that the prawn stock in the Irish Sea is three times the size that they 
had previously estimated. Secondly, as a result of the DEFRA-sponsored fishery science 
partnership, observers on local vessels have indicated and proven that the by-catch, 
particularly of cod, from the nephrops fishery is, in their terms, minimal. In view of those two 
factors, will the Minister ensure not only that there is no further reduction in the TAC or 
quotas for nephrops in the Irish Sea, but that there is an increase” (FISHupdate.com: 
http://www.fishupdate.com)? 
 The Principle of Relative Stability is as already mentioned, the allocation key used to 
divide the TACs among the Member States, and it has become the most important principle of 
the CFP (Morin 2000). It provides a rigid system which defines a static balance in the 
resource distribution among the Member States. The lack of flexibility may not agree with the 
free market economy that the “Inner marked” of the Union favours with freedom to establish 
enterprises or freely find employment in any of the Member States. In this way the Principle 
may be said to represent a paradox. The one flexible element of this distribution system is the 
so called “quota hopping,” which renders possible the exchange of quotas between states as is 
stated in Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 170/83, where the Principle was first 
introduced.    
 If we take a closer look at the basis for the Principle it is stated in the preamble of the 
above mentioned regulation (in addition to EEC Regulation 3760/92 which actually has 
substituted Regulation (EEC) No 170/83) that one of the aims is to “safeguard the particular 
needs of regions where local populations are especially dependent on fisheries and related 
industries” (Court of Justice of the European Communities 1998:http://www.worldlii.org/eu). 
The problem here is that fisheries dependent regions and industries are not properly defined 
(Morin 2000), something that can result in controversies and unjust allocations. How will for 
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instance a region be regarded that is dependent on fisheries conducted in another States sea 
area (Morin 2000)? And what about a region where something occurs that makes it natural to 
change into a fisheries dependent region? 
 Although the Principle has served its purpose concerning protecting regions from 
large fishing fleets from other States, it has had to endure a lot of criticism. According to “EU 
in Ireland,” an informative web-site on EU matters relevant to Ireland, The Republic for 
instance, did very badly in relation to the quota allocations back in the 80s because the 
division was based on catch records and Ireland´s fleet comprised mainly of small boats with 
poor track record in most of the fisheries. Ministers responsible for fisheries have tried to 
amend this for many years, but it is difficult because all such changes require majority votes. 
In additions some States such as France has such a high share that it barely manages to fish it. 
Dominic Rihan commented that quota sharing is still based on 25 years ago, even though a lot 
has changed. For the rest of the countries the average fishery of 1973 to 1978 was the basis of 
allocation while for Ireland the quotas are based on 1975 multiplied by 2. “They did not even 
have landing figures and such at this time,” he said. From the perspective of Joe Maddock 
however, the Irish fishers of the Irish Sea are self-sufficient, whereas the Northern Irish being 
part of UK has only fractions of the share out. He said: “We did very well when the share-outs 
of tax and quotas because the fishing was very good at the time when quotas were decided” 
He is actually saying that Ireland get a large portions of the quotas something that is 
confusing and contradictory to what is claimed elsewhere. The explanation may lie within the 
part of the principle of Relative Stability called the Hague Preference which allows the 
Republic of Ireland to have twice the amount of fish it would nominally have been entitled to 
at times when stocks are low and this is on behalf of the share of other parties. Alan McCulla 
brought this system to my attention during his interview when he stated that: “Then in the 
Irish sea there is a system called the Hague Preference. It is a mechanism whereby if the 
quotas fall below a certain threshold, Ireland is more dependent on fish than UK, we cut from 
UK to Ireland.” In order to get some idea of what it accounts for in recent times I am referring 
to a written answer to a question posed by Iris Robinson who represents the Democratic 
Unionist Party of Northern Ireland to the UK fisheries minister at that time, Elliot Morley, 
regarding the Hague preference.  The answer is from 2 April 2003 and goes as follows: 
“Discussions with Ireland are continuing, but it has not to date proved possible to agree swaps 
which compensate UK fishermen for 2003 quota lost as a result of the operation of Hague 
Preference”  (TheyWorkForYou.com House of Commons Written answers Wednesday, 2 
April 2003: http://www.theyworkforyou). The cod fishery in Div. VIIa is dominated by the 
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UK (NI) pelagic and bottom trawl fleets and by the Irish trawl fleet, which mainly operates in 
the western Irish Sea. (ICES CM 2002 ACFM 09). In other words the effect of The Hague 
Preference concerning cod is felt primarily in Northern Ireland. (Northern Ireland Forum for 
Political Dialogue 1996 (appendix c):http://www.niforum,, UK Parliament House of 
Commons 2002 Column 923 and 924: http://www.parliament) 
 During a debate in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom Parliament the 2nd 
of December 2004 the warped nature of The Hague preference was addressed. The great 
disadvantage this embodies for the Northern Irish fishing industry was emphasized and the 
absurdity that the two fishing industries of the island of Ireland was mentioned as they can see 
one another fishing across “Carlingford loch,” a water border not even one mile wide. “To 
have one regime on one side of it and another on the other is nonsense. The Hague preference 
greatly militates against Northern Ireland fishermen in that respect.”  Mr. Eddie McGrady of 
the Social Democratic and Labor Party said. This is a Northern Irish Unionist party and 
without entering the field of political aspects of UK vs Ireland, I will only draw the attention 
to the fact that both the nationalists and the unionists of Northern Ireland see this as a problem, 
and so it may not be ignored as political agenda. In another debate in the House of Commons 
from Thursday, 16 January 2003, Elliot Morley rejoiced the retention of the Hague preference 
since it is beneficial to UK (TheyWorkForYou.com House of Commons debates Thursday, 16 
January 2003   http://www.theyworkforyou) and this mirrors the fact that the UK fishery in 
the Irish Sea is of minor importance as the amounts in tonnage of the North Sea and other 
areas concerning cod is so much bigger than that of the Irish Sea. This was a point also made 
by Barrie Deas during his telephone interview.  
 It is tempting to indicate that as quotas go down, it is of benefit to Ireland that they go 
beyond the threshold for invoking the Hague Preference. This could mean that the Cod 
Recovery Plan is beneficial to the Republic of Ireland. Without drawing any conclusions, I 
need to mention the threat the ecosystem approach in combination with the Hague Preference 
renders to the fishing industry of Northern Ireland, because they are so dependent on the 
nephrops. Because cod is a by-catch of the nephrops fishery, there is a chance that these 
quotas will be reduced, and what happens if they are reduced to a point where Ireland can 
invoke on the Hague Preference?  
  All in all the Hague preference seems to be a mythical and blurry part of the quota 
allocation in this area, but it was originally created as a means to protect regions in special 
need of fisheries. The bottom line is that it seems as though an old resolution designed at 
times when situations were different, still have not been replaced or erased. The Uk fisheries 
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minister Ben Bradshaw in answering questions in the House of Commons in December 2004 
said this about the UK application of the Hague Preference:” We have refrained from invoking 
Hague Preference in some cases where stocks are seriously depleted, as in these cases the full 
operation of Hague Preference could transfer the bulk—or in some cases all—of other 
member states' allocations to the UK” (UK Parliament House of Commons Column 1220 
2004: http://www.publications.parliament). 
  As the official Recovery Plan was implemented in 2004, it brought with it harvest 
control rules aiming at a 30% increase of the cod stock by the end of each year. Although the 
industry is frustrated over the low quotas there are people claiming that the quotas are still too 
high for recovery of the cod stock to happen. Ciaran Kelly pointed out that the 15% limit for 
variations in the quota, may end up counteracting cod recovery.   
 Alan McCulla brought to my attention further problems of the industry in terms of 
quotas:” and there is another agenda here and this agenda is POLITICAL. In terms of green 
lobby vs. our level of fisheries politic and it is obvious who will bring in most votes, and then 
competition between fishermen .Now even deeper mess, happens in Iceland, and now in the 
UK and northern Ireland. Some groups of the fishing industry are less concerned with setting 
the quotas at a level where fishers can fish and reflecting what fish is in the sea  and more 
concerned with setting quota where they can earn money leasing the quota. And they do not 
want the quota to be too high. So from within the industry they are counteracting and 
stabbing the others in the back. For most fishermen they want to be out fishing, but some will 
always be different”. He also explained how the TAC system has reduced quotas since the 70s 
when quotas were incredibly high and no one ever managed to fish all. Because of this the 
quotas were reduced the next year, and this has continued and the fishermen feel it is a 
cunning system. He claimed there are some dinosaurs left in Brussels and mentioned that 
Northern Ireland has more capacity to fish for herring than the three boats that are allowed to 
fish now. But because of measures that were said to be temporary 29 years ago, they are not 
allowed to increase the effort even though there is a lot of herring now. He continued 
commenting on the cod situation: “Throughout the 70s the quota was 10,000, and Ireland 
caught maybe 3000, we caught 4000. Someone in Brussels said that 70000, that is 70%of the 
TAC. So the fishers don’t need the 10,000tons. They cut it down.”  This year for instance the 
cod quota was cut by 15% and the nephrops quota reduced by more than 10% in the Irish Sea 
although the nephrops stock is in a good state. Northern Ireland this time gained some 
benefits on a small increase in their prawn quota however. (BBC News Wednesday, 7 
December 2005: http://news.bbc)  
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 Dominic Rihan criticises the fact that the quota system makes management for all 
species according to the cod-system. He thinks it should be driven by fisheries management 
rather than cod, by trying to control the amount of effort and he doesn’t think there will be a 
lot of people arguing with that. “You do not need quotas, a fishing boat can only fish for 24 
hours of day. Can only catch a certain amount. And this can be established it is not difficult. 
Best managed fisheries in the world, do not have quotas.” He also commented that:  
“Fishermen become totally anti to any regulation recovery end of world cod is disappearing, 
makes fishermen anti”  
 In a WWF article on the European recovery plans, the harvest control rules of the 
plans is criticised because the TAC appears to only account for the catch and no effort to 
reduce bycatch and discard has been included. In addition it has a 15% limit to quota change, 
which is expected to undermine the recovery (Rosenberg and Mogensen 2002, Kelley et al 
2006). A third aspect is the high mortality reference level of 0,72 set for cod in the Irish Sea, 
which is more than the double of the reference level for cod stocks in other parts of the world. 
According to the authors of this article only the recent history of abundance and recruitment 
has been used in the calculations of the fishing mortality rate thus giving, ignoring the fact 
that this was registered during heavy exploitation. If earlier history had been included, one 
would see that the stock was more productive under lower exploitation rates (Rosenberg and 
Mogensen 2005). The Harvest Control Rules introduced in 2004 actually resulted in an 
increase of the cod TAC from 2003 to 2004 (Kelley et al 2006).  
  I will let the words of Lorcan Ó Cinnéide end this part of the discussion: “The numbers of 
cod is so low people tell us. We don’t know if we will have reproduction this year. This has 
been for the last 10 years. If this is right we would be on the minus side.  People have 
announced the doom and gloom for as long as I have been on the planet. The management 




Major points of discussion: 
- Reduced quotas may have encouraged underreporting of catch and maybe even self-
justifiable underreporting because fishers do not have confidence in the management 
system or the scientists, and feel that they have not been listened to. Such remnants as 
the Hague Preference contributes to increase the feeling of being unjustly treated. So, 
the Hague preference may indirectly be undermining the recovery of cod. 
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- In order to manage fisheries with TACs and quotas successfully, assessment must be 
very good! As soon as assessment is impaired because of low degree of accuracy, the 
advised TACs are based on too much uncertainty to be reliable.  
 
- Introduction of the Ecosystem Approach to the present management may turn out to 
be very complicated and may require a change of management system 
 
- The ecosystem approach represents a constant threat to the fisheries because quotas 
for other species are decided according to the cod quota. As long as the nephrops quota 
is not reduced the remaining fishermen in the Irish Sea are doing ok, but the moment it 
is decided that the nephrops quota be reduced according to the cod quota, there will be a 
social crisis. This probably creates an unpleasant anticipation that increases the 
frustration within the industry.  
 
- This system gives room for opportunism within the industry because the quotas are so 
low and people have to pay a lot of money just to lease them.  
 
- Biological and ecological advice from scientists end up in political horse-trading and 
the quest of not loosing access to the resources becomes more important than scientific 
advices.  
 
The result of these factors may be that TACs and quotas have become obstacles to cod 
recovery during the Cod Recovery Plan. 
 
 
4.3. The social aspects of closure and technical measures 
 
 In 2000 an area of the Irish Sea where cod used to spawn was closed to fishing from 
February to the end of April. This was based on the idea that there would be more cod left to 
spawn undisturbed by closing the area to fishing activity. The nephrops boats were allowed to 
fish in certain patches within the area, because they claimed they had very little cod bycatch, 
they did not affect the spawn and they were dependent upon fishing in certain areas when 
tides were low. Marine protected areas (MPAs) or closed areas have been around for quite 
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some time but the last three decades there have been a lot of changes in the number of areas, 
their size and location, and the restrictions imposed. The wide definition that FAO uses for 
Marine protected area is the following "any area of intertidal or subtidal terrain, together with 
its overlying waters and  associated flora, fauna, historical and cultural features, which has 
been preserved by legislation or other effective means to protect all or part of the enclosed 
environment" (Kelleher and Recchia. 1998).  The most famous example of fishery closure is 
the 1994 Grand Banks southeast of Newfoundland where three large areas totaling 17,000 
km2 were closed to groundfish fishery, a multispecies group including cod and Haddock 
among many others. (Gell and Roberts. 2003, Wikipedia Marine Protected Areas 2006: 
http://en.wikipedia.org). 
 An  article by Bortsfor et al (2004) lists three categories upon which sustainability and 
yield in marine reserves depend: “(1) uncertainty in population response to management (less 
when employing marine reserves than in conventional management), (2) uncertainty in the 
slope of the stock-recruitment relationship at low abundance (affects both reserves and 
conventional fishery management), and (3) uncertainty in the pattern of larval dispersal 
affects management by reserves much more than conventional fishery management.” The 
article also points to the need of empirical information on both sustainability and yield since 
most available results are from models, and to the importance of thorough knowledge on what 
kinds of reserves (i.e., Size and spacing) sustain and show increased yield for which kind of 
species (i.e., dispersal distances) (Botsford et al 2004) Another important issue addressed is 
that implementation of closed areas typically will increase yields only in fisheries with 
excessive effort (Botsford 2005) 
 In a work by Jaworski et al 2005 the effect of area closure was tested on two different 
locations. The two different sites showed different results. In one area increase in abundance 
was generally evident in haddock and small size classes of long rough dab suggesting that 
indirect fishing mortality (such as discards) had been substantial before the closure. While 
exploitable size classes of haddock and cod showed an increase in abundance in the other site, 
small size classes of cod and haddock were adversely affected by the closure. This can be 
explained by increased predation by the more abundant cod. The goal of preserving 3-5 year 
old cod was however reached in one of the areas, but no effect was apparent in the other. The 
reason for this may be that the fishing effort prior to the closure was ten times lower in the 
latter area. This supports the already mentioned theory that a heavy initial level of exploitation 
is required in order to detect changes in a fish community based on closed areas. Although 
area closure is considered to be most efficient for more sedentary species the conclusion of 
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this investigation was that species with great mobility such as cod and hake, may benefit from 
area closures, but there will always be transfer of fish between closed and open areas 
(Jaworski et al 2005)  
 According to World Wildlife Fund, there seems to be a distinction between fishery 
closures and protected areas. They define fishery closures as “areas temporarily closed to 
fishing for one or more species or to specific fishing gears or vessel size employed to help 
rebuild depleted stocks, reduce gear conflicts, protect vulnerable life stages of exploited 
species or protect sensitive habitats from damaging gears” (Gell and Roberts 2003). Closed 
area is a tool for conservation and restoration of fish habitats providing insurance against 
uncertainties in fisheries science Although there are several examples of closed areas having a 
beneficial effect on pressured stocks, (Cote et al 2001, Robets et al 2001, Fisher and Frank 
2004, Stonea et al 2004)  the process of creating, deciding on, implementing and enforcing it 
can be confrontational (Link and Demarest  2003).  Stakeholders on the verge of loosing their 
privileges may be in opposition because of lack of trust towards managers and scientists. 
Unfair allocation of privileges may add to the tension and these problems are particularly 
predominant when stakeholders are not fully involved in the design and planning of the closed 
areas (Kelleher and Recchia 1998). In addition as groundfish populations continue to decline 
in areas open to fishing, pressure to allow access to the closed areas increases, or at least a 
revaluation of the design of it. Although they have been in effect for some time, hardly any 
evidence is available that demonstrates the effectiveness of closed areas at protecting fishery 
resources (Jaworski et al 2005). If closed areas are to be useful in contributing to 
sustainability, they need to control catch better than conventional fisheries management 
(Botsford 2005). According to Kaplan and Botsford (2005) there is a poor understanding of 
the size and configuration of closed areas best suited to reaching fisheries and conservation 
goals.  
 Baskett et al 2005  concluded in their article that although closures may be more 
robust to uncertainty, traditional management approaches, such as adjustments to harvest rate 
and maximum size limits, can lead to equivalent or greater long-term biomass yield. Botsford 
(2005) claims that fishery closures can produce greater catches than conventional 
management for migratory fish, this will however require knowledge about movement 
patterns. They are more robust to uncertainties in abundance estimates and effect of fishing 
regulations, but they depend equally on the level of lifetime reproduction patterns and larval 
dispersal distances which are highly uncertain. The relationship between habitat type and the 
ability of fish populations to survive, the growth, feeding etc are factors that fishery managers 
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and other stakeholders are pushing for information about, and these relationships and the 
reasons for maintaining area closures remain difficult.  
  Nevertheless closure of the estimated cod spawning ground of the Irish Sea together 
with technical measures was implemented and is still effectuated. 
 ”The initial plan was to have all boats out of the horseshoe area,” Joe Maddock  
recalled during interview when he was describing the events of the initiation of the protective 
measures, and he continued: “the prawn fleets from UK and Ireland, the semi-pelagic trawlers 
from Northern-Ireland, and demersal trawlers from Ireland and beam trawlers became 
worried when they saw the plan on paper. They started looking for derogations for rights to 
continue fishing. The prawn fisheries wanted to continue since they were not targeting cod. It 
was allowed, and this caused people to feel unjustly treated. Experiments carried out with 
pelagic, semi pelagic and rockhopper trawlers and beam trawlers. To see weather they could 
fish without catching cod during the season. If they caught more than 15% the experiments 
failed. The results were 17-18% average for the ones fishing for haddock, beam trawlers and 
rockhoppers caught over 15%. It proved that all these would catch cod, but it also proved that 
there were cod in the closed area. The spawning area is from March. The idea of the large 
box was to protect on the way to the areas and also after the spawning. They spawned mid-
march. When the cod spawn, the spawn rises and this a mitigating factor for the prawn boats, 
they meant they weren’t affecting the cod.”  Joe Maddock also added: “The semi-pelagic fleet 
from the north of Ireland, scientists predicted that if this type of fishing vessels continued to 
operate as it was doing the stock will continue to decline. The people who have this fleet were 
very worried that they would be held responsible. The southern fleet specialized in trawls with 
lift. The northern fleet fish more efficiently. Easy to target the fish. People have argued 
against these types of boats, but also against beam trawlers and gillnetters and other boats. 
From our own perspective we need to believe that complete closure must be beneficial.” 
 Ciaran Kelly said that they closed the area with the notion that this would benefit the 
stock, but the mechanisms of how this should happen are not very clearly explained. In his 
opinion if you close an area the effort may just move to other areas, so the instrument of the 
Recovery Plan should not be focused on just closing the area, it should be focusing on 
reducing exploitation. By which measures,  is up to the managers to decide, he added. 
 Alan McCulla pointed in his interview to the fact that the Northern Irish fishermen 
were the ones affected hardest by the closed area:  “because the closures were posed on us as 
part of the Irish Sea cod recovery plan engineered so the Irish was not affected. Towards the 
end of 1999 there was a big push to bring on a plan. We took up the issue with our 
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administration in Belfast. We argued that the situation was not as black based on own 
observations,” he said. He went on explaining that they had responded to the proposition of 
implementing a recovery plan by telling their fishermen to come up with their own measures 
designed to protect the cod in order to avoid the overall plan. These measures were intended 
as a package and included amongst other things closed areas and technical measures. “But 
finally we got to Brussels sitting around the conference table the British team, the Irish team, 
Belgian etc. The UK team were presented as amateurs no one agreed, no one knew.  The Irish 
had a common goal, they were well organised. They said that yes cod needs protecting, it is 
not our fault, so don’t punish our vessels. Ireland successfully blamed that we have statistics 
and the 40 trawls fishing cod in the Irish Sea. A lot of closures and measures based on 
statistics. Our scientists have a lot of data and the Irish delegation did not have that because 
they said that they did not catch any cod in the Irish Sea, while our scientists had to say that 
yes we have statistics and we did catch cod. Consequence of not being united that measures 
were imposed right on our doorstep!” The result of this according to Alan Mc Culla was that 
in 2000 more than 40 of the Northern Ireland whitefish trawlers were in trouble because the 
three months of closure was when most fishing was done. “We had more than 40, now we 
have 12 boats catching white fish. Some decommissioned, some switched for prawn -problems. 
Some fishers retired, some have found other jobs, big problem.” He also explained how 
Northern Ireland by some had been blamed for having 40 super efficient trawlers that were 
responsible for fishing the cod: “Well these boats were no more than 24 metres long with 4-
500 KW engine power and average age was about 30 years. Absolute rubbish!” he concluded 
According to Lorcán Ó Cinnéide the process of implementing the closed area was more 
political than biological. “We know there was an element of horse trading, because the areas 
are not where they should be. The idea was that there would be zones where there would be 
no fishing, zones with selective fishing gear, and then derogations for beamers from certain 
areas. The effect of the whole thing was lost because of the derogations. Should have closed 
the whole area. Secondly it wasn’t enforced. No effort to enforce. Quite a high degree of 
compliance the first year, but only 1.2 arrests since the start, and that sends the wrong 
message to people” he concluded. Dominic Rihan said something similar: “The fishermen see 
themselves that this has helped, but I think fishers would prefer a total closure, because they 
will see that oh he goes in there, I have to go in there tomorrow. If the fishery is closed times 
of the year. Where you have different derogations it is difficult for fishermen to deal with.”  
 Many argue that the derogations are the reasons why the recovery plan doesn’t or will 
not work. According to Alan McCulla another reason is that the cod might migrate from other 
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areas. He continued by saying: “this is why we suggested a rolling closure, following the 
stocks on the way to the spawning area. Like dragging a flock of sheep, we want to make sure 
that as many sheep get there as possible. As it is now with the cod closure when we get them 
to the other town, only half of the herd is left and this is when we start protecting them.”  
He also pointed to another possible factor why the cod stock had been so much reduced, 
which was a large gillnet fishery that had been developed for cod in the Celtic Sea (on the 
southern border of the Irish Sea). “Last year the Irish all of a sudden wanted a closure of the 
gillnetting there in the Celtic Sea. The only reason that was brought on was to get off the days 
at sea regime. So previously they had not wanted any restrictions on the gillnetters in the 
Celtic Sea, but suddenly they turned, and only because they knew otherwise days at sea would 
come along.” This emphasises the point made by Lorcan Ó Cinnéide that everything comes 
down to politics and that the scientific aspects are lost in the process. It also shows the lack of 
trust that prevails in this area concerning fisheries matters, and the fact that everything seems 
to be driven by political agendas eventually. There are however investigations made on the 
seasonal migration of cod between the Irish Sea and the Celtic Sea that showed very litter 
interchange of cod between the two areas (The stock Book 2005). 
 A cod closure was also introduced in the North Sea from February to the end of April 
2001 according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 259/2001, where no fishing was to take 
place with the exception of purse seining and trawling for sandeels and pelagics. There has 
been a lot of debate as to the positioning of the closed areas, and wether they have been 
covering enough space to result in the expected reduction in fishing mortality. Another debate 
has been on the effect of area closure as long as effort Is reallocated instead of removed.  
 According to a recent work, traditional management approaches, such as adjustments 
to harvest rate and maximum size limits, can lead to equivalent protection against 
anthropogenic selection (fishing) and equivalent or greater long-term biomass yield than 
establishing MPAs; however, the protection and yield from establishing no-take MPAs 
appears more robust to uncertainty (Baskett et al 2005).  It seems to me as closed areas are 
applied as a means to avoid the enormous challenge it would be achieving enough knowledge 
to trust traditional management to rebuild stocks, when the fact is that a lot of knowledge 
about the ecosystem is also required in order to be certain that we benefit from closed areas in 
terms of increased recruitment. 
 In 1995 the Commission presented a communication on implementing technical 
measures into the CFP. The reason for this was to create conditions to minimise capture of 
juvenile fish. This was to be conducted by improving the selectivity of fishing gear. The 
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communication addresses recovery of the Arctic cod in the Barents Sea which in 1995 
showed a total stock biomass at the highest level since 1978 due to technical measures 
coupled with catch limitations and favourable environmental conditions (Commission COM 
(95) 669 )This means that technical measures was something fishers were familiar with prior 
to 2000. The application of such measures has been debated since fishers have often been 
reluctant because many claim they will reduce the catch, or in mixed fisheries to reduce the 
catch of one species. Alan McCulla commented: “scientists are saying we want fishermen to 
adopt a net that is not going to catch any fish, which means we have to catch more prawns to 
make a living. And what impact will this have on the prawn stock?” 
  Dominic Rihan of the BIM recalled this from the initiation of the plan: “when the first 
cod recovery was introduced we were approached by the industry in order to find technical 
solutions to release cod from the gear for the nephrops fishery to keep fishing without 
catching cod. The area was about one third of the nephrops fishing grounds. Also physically 
quantify the actual bycatch of cod in the fishery. What our fishermen in nephrops were saying 
was that the catch was very small for a majority of the year less than 5-6%. Commission 
questioned that theory, and after the first year of the regulation, they put in something new; 
Belgium, Ireland and Uk had to do an observer program during the closed time to quantify 
the by-catch”. He admits it is true they had 18% cod by-catch checking out the nephrops 
fishery, but this was based on VERY small catches:  “Catch of 40 kilo and 4 cod. But there is 
a by-catch there and that’s an issue. But as I said on the trials we got by-catch down to 2-3% 
of the nephrops catch.” He continued by stating that unless some benefits are provided for 
using selective gear or some punishment is handed out for not using them there may be little 
incentive for fishers to go the extra mile. He also pointed to a highly irrational decision made 
by the Commission concerning technical measures connected to the “Days at Sea” regime. 
Although increasing mesh sizes is working for reducing bycatch of cod, silly decisions in the 
Commission has resulted in a contradictory situation where those fishing with 100mm mesh 
size or more were not allowed because they were chasing the cod, while those fishing with 
smaller mesh sizes were not targeting cod and were allowed. This resulted in more large boats 
going to nephrops fishery, and this added to the already existing bycatch problem of the 
nephrops fleet. This will however be more thoroughly addressed later. 
 According to the web-page of the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) 
discarding of small juvenile cod, haddock and other species in the nephrops, roundfish and 
flatfish fisheries are very high, and the proportion of total catch discarded have increased 
gradually.  Although EU has decided on increasing the mesh size of the roundfish fishery, the 
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Nephrops fishery still uses 70 and 80 mm meshes. This is in accordance with what Dominic 
Rihan said and continues his line of thought by commenting on the need for additional 
measures such as increasing the mesh size of the cod end and square mesh panels, and the 
introduction of separator grids in the trawl to enable undersized fish to escape. There are 
however also ongoing debates as to weather technical measures are working according to plan. 
One investigation conducted by ACFM showed that increased mesh sizes for cod in the North 
Sea was expected to contribute to only insignificant increase in SSB in the short term, and 
only a 5% increase in the long term. One comment from the Fisheries Science Services of the 
Marine Institute in this respect is that as a general rule because of fast growth and large size of 
the fish, cod will not be significantly impacted by larger cod end mesh sizes. For haddock and 
whiting larger mesh sizes will have a significant effect (The Stock Book 2005). Looking at 
the closed areas and technical measures as they have been applied since 2000 in the Irish Sea, 
there is one obvious characteristic: they get increasingly complex and extensive for each year 
the first three years of the interim measures. (See Appendix II) This is the result of 
derogations being pushed and provided for as a result of pressure from the fishermen and the 
rest of the industry. Fishermen had been consulted about the cod closure but according to 
Alan McCulla fishers often say that we are making ourselves heard but are people listening to 
them? “Consultation exercises, be it about closed areas or whatever they want to introduce, 
they have to consult, but the feeling is that after the consultation exercise, the government go 
home and do whatever they want.  This is a big problem for the fishermen,” he concluded. 
Also for Northern Ireland it is positive as long as the recovery measures have come to stay, 
that the cod closure is remained because the alternative may be only days at sea, which is 
worse. 
 
Major points of discussion: 
- Closed areas require a lot of knowledge about particular areas and stocks and their 
ecosystems in order to reveal the usefulness of potential closed areas, and thus do not 
differ from classical measures in this respect. It may seem as though this is implemented 
without any concrete knowledge that it will help. At worst it may counteract its purpose 
of protecting spawning cod, because it may create a false impression of protection 
leading to reduced responsibility for cod recovery elsewhere.  
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- The unfair manner with which these measures strike may indirectly result in 
disillusion among the fishermen and the industry and less confidence in the system. In 
turn that may lead to poor incentive to follow regulations in general. 
 
-Closed areas are expected to be more robust to uncertainty 
 
- There are no incentives for fishermen to use selective gear beyond those requirements 
that come under “Days at Sea” 
 
- The Commission has made regulations for technical measures that counteract their 
own intentions of reducing cod bycatch. The reason is probably the high degree of 
complexity that these measures are comprised of, and because of this the necessity to 
look in every direction and to think every possibility before making decisions. The result 
is, however, a notion that the Commission does not understand the industry, and that 
they are not able to correct errors spontaneously. This leads to distrust in the ones 
making the regulations. 
 
- The industry needs to interpret and follow these regulations so the complexity of the 
measures comprises a problem for them. In my opinion this may lead to irritability and 
lack of incentive to cooperate.  
These factors together may contribute to the plan not meeting its goals  
  
 
4.4. Introducing input Restriction into the plan – “Days at Sea” 
 
 When there is justified suspicion that the management schemes effectuated result in 
underreporting of catches, restricting the number of days fishing boats may go to sea to fish 
can be a good solution (BBC News Wednesday, 7 December 2005: http://news.bbc) .  In 2004 
following the reform of the CFP and the promise for stricter measures, effort restrictions 
under the name of “Days at Sea,” were imposed on some of the Irish Sea fishermen. The 
instructions were necessarily quite complicated because this regime requires definitions of the 
vessels and gear, in addition to derogations. But for 2004 and 2005 the regulations were quite 
similar. The days were provided per month and there was an overall reduction in days per 
month from 2004 to 2005. In 2006 the regulation follows a new, more detailed setup, where 
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days are provided per year instead of per month. According to Barrie Deas the instructions 
were so complicated that it took the industry until April to sort them out. He also added that 
days per year instead of per month provide more freedom for the fishermen because this 
means they can spread the fishing activity as they please. The overall number of days was 
reduced further in 2006. Alan McCulla is comparing the Days at Sea regime to pulling the 
plug out of the plughole in your sink: ever decreasing circle. He explained: “they start by 
setting the level very high; fishers said oh I never fished for all those days. But for every year 
the days at sea is cut lower and lower, and now there are too few days, and in addition to all 
these measures and still the scientists say that this does not help.” 
 According to Dominic Rihan the days at sea makes a mockery of gear selectivity 
because the Commission wants to stop all fishing with 100mm or greater because they are 
fishing the cod while the smaller mesh sizes are not used for fishing cod and would be 
allowed. This has in addition caused the larger boats to move to nephrops fishing because 
they would get more days to fish, but the situation with cod bycatch did not improve. Fishers 
will always be looking to maximise days at sea, so in his opinion, this adds to the problem of 
getting fishers to use selective gear. He continues: “They have tried to do something, if you 
have less than 5% of cod in your track record you are not affected by the days at sea. But this 
has not made the cake. Problem is they haven’t defined the fisheries well enough, they want to 
define it according to one mesh size,  or a single mesh size range but fisheries in the north sea, 
west of Scotland, Irish sea, off the west of Ireland is much more complex much more elements 
and more mixed fisheries. You need to define those better and then to find the days at sea. It is 
nearly best if days at sea should be tailored to the individual vessel. Not an easy thing to do 
for the commission, but if you do not define the fleet groups better or do something it will not 
recover cod stocks. Driving fishers into the 80 mm range so everyone will be there will not do 
the trick .The other thing is the cynical way they drew the area of days at sea. Particularly 
area 6 along the continental shelf, done to exclude the French!! Very little to do with science. 
We did some trials on juvenile cod and spawning grounds in 6a, a lot of hauls 4-5oo and the 
by catch was almost zero. But still they are affected. And they would like to fish with higher 
mesh size, but they will then be affected by days at sea.” 
 Alan McCulla explained that the fishermen feel they have been confined into smaller 
and smaller boxes because of the gear regulations and the fact that that they can no longer fish 
in areas they used to and cannot target other species. They used to fish herring, cod and 
prawns but first the herring fishery was removed, so the fleet adapted to two species. “Then 
funnily enough there was too much pressure on the cod, and now the three fisheries we had is 
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reduced to one. What happens if the scientists say that oh, the pressure is too high on the 
prawn? Management decisions are forced, and the flexibility is gone. You will fish in one 
area, with one gear for one species. What is the result going to be?” he said.  
 Joe Maddock said that many argue that Days at sea is a better alternative than the 
closed box because if you only have half the year to fish, the pressure will be efficiently 
reduced and there is no way people can make up the time they loose fishing, particularly for 
the demersal species. In his opinion this is why the fishermen are so opposed to days at sea 
because it does the job. Joe thinks that closed boxes will be abandoned to purely days at sea: 
“Big fear for fishermen days at sea. The French has no real worry because they have big 
quotas, but days at sea are a very big threat to them. When fishermen get very opposed to 
something we are getting closed to what is working,” he concluded. 
 As it turned out the Irish industry apparently did not have that much to complain about 
the first three years of the interim measures, as the closed box linked to the technical measures 
did not affect them much and the reduction in TAC regarded cod only. But as the measures of 
2003 including massive cuts in the TACs of a range of species in addition to the threat of 
reduced days at sea, the Irish fishermen reacted. The Industry arranged a day of protest on the 
13th of December 2002 where all fishermen gave up one day of fishing in order to protest 
(Media Release 2002: http://www.beara.info)  
 There can be little doubt that days at sea are good measures in order to reduce fishing 
pressure, but this requires that the number of days is sufficiently reduced. According to 
Rosenberg and Mogensen (2005), the baseline used for the effort reduction system are the 
highest years of effort implying that effort will remain near the highest level. Additionally 
exceptions for steaming time are given, and this was already accounted for in the calculation 
of the baseline, and becomes excess fishing time. The authors also point to the fact that a 5% 
bycatch of cod which is the downward limit for extra fishing time, can present a substantial 
amount for those vessels in a high volume fishery. It also encourages bycatch as long as it 
remains under 5% (Rosenberg and Mogensen 2005, Kelly et al 2006)  
Another factor of the effort restriction is that it is much easier to monitor and control than 
other measures, because it is easy to keep track of the boats when they are at port.   
 When fishermen in Scotland were asked what kind of fisheries management they 
would propose to replace TACs, an input and effort control system with a certain number of 
days to fish was proposed as a more viable alternative according to 94% of those asked 
(Rossiter and Stead 2002.) They were however reluctant to having to answer such a question.  
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Major points of discussion: 
- Days at Sea is indirectly resulting in a maintenance and maybe even increase in the cod 
baycatch. 
 
- It seems to me as some fishermen feel that the system of effort reduction is cunning 
because in their opinion they were introduced to it under false pretences and days seem 
to be reduced each year. This may give them an excuse to be uncooperative in complying 
with the measures.  
 
- The before mentioned problem with pushing fishermen towards 80mm range of fishing 
(nephrops) may be undermining the authority of the Days at Sea regime, since the 
overall goal of reducing effort results in a reallocation of effort. And there is a good 
chance this reallocation results in increased bycatch of cod. 
 
- Days at Sea were the last measure of the recovery plan and so it was introduced “on 
top of everything else.” 
 
- “when the fishermen react the measures are working,” if this is the case this regime 
should be efficient. 
 
- According to some scientists the degree of reduction in days to fish is not large enough 
to achieve the goal of rebuilding the cod stock. 
 
The other measures introduced before Days at Sea may have given the industry an 
argument that they had been suffering all the other reductions and now this in addition and 
such made it difficult to be as harsh as necessary.  
 
 
4.5. Compliance, control and surveillance: 
 
  
 According to the above mentioned article (Rossiter and Stead 2002) the overall 
opinion of the fishermen interviewed was that the enforcement of fisheries regulations 
throughout the EU was poor, and although they were against the TAC system, they agreed 
that if properly enforced, the system would have worked (Rossiter and Stead 2002). Shepherd 
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1999 listed some requirement for managing according to TACs and Quotas, two of which 
were dealt with under that part. The third precondition concerns enforcement, and this is a 
problem area for most fisheries, and maybe especially within the EU. There are specific 
instructions within the frameworks of the Recovery Plan, such as instructions for 
communication of entry and exit to and from ports and to and from areas, reporting of catch, 
what to include in the logbook, how transportation of cod shall happen, and many more. 
These are logical measures of control introduced in order to keep a closer look on the cod 
situation in this area. But except from the obligation of the member states to provide lists of 
infringements to the commission, the same problems with enforcing these regulations remain. 
The Member States are left to control and enforce regimes that have been constructed far 
away from where the fishery takes place. In my opinion this is bound to reduce the efficiency 
of the Recovery Plan. As long as Member States are in charge of enforcing regulations of the 
CFP, there will always be a chance of national opportunism. This chance increases as some 
Member States may be less serious about enforcement than others.  
 There are some attempts centrally within the EU to improve this situation resulting in 
the planning and establishment of a Community Fisheries Control Agency with the primary 
task of coordinating fisheries control and inspection activities by the Member 
StatesAccording to Harm Koster the Chief Executive elected mid-June 2006, the agency can 
be expected to be progressively running as from 2007 (e-mail). 
According to a press release the creation of the Agency will not change the fact that the 
responsibility for control and enforcement of the Common Fisheries Policy lies with the 
Member States. The Agency is led by an Administrative Board, made up of one representative 
per Member State and six representatives of the Commission. The Agency will be depending 
on input from Advisory Boards made up of stakeholders nominated by the Regional Advisory 
Councils (RAC´s), in order to ensure transparency and contact with stakeholders  
 
Major points of discussion: 
- In a Recovery Plan context control and enforcement are very important factors which 
need to be working optimally. There are indications that control, surveillance and 
enforcement of the Recovery Plan is not conducted to such a degree required in order to 
get the wanted results. 
 
- The new Fisheries Control Agency is to be situated in Spain, and with the Spanish 
history of opportunism, this may lead to less confidence in the Agency. 
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It is common knowledge that making laws and regulations without enforcing them is not 
very efficient. In a Recovery Context control and enforcement need to be even better than 
under normal circumstances as long as the regulations come from centrally in the CFP.  ‘ 
 
 
4.6. Decommissioning tie -ups and some social aspects 
 
 Decommissioning has been a controversial part of the CFP for many years. It was 
supposed to be a means for balancing the fishing effort within the union to the size of the 
resource, but the systems were not capable of performing this task. One of the reasons is that 
rather than changing the long-term economic incentive generating overcapacity it must be 
regarded as a short term firefight solution. Decommissioning schemes can actually counteract 
permanent reduction in fleets because it reduces the risk of investing in a fishing vessel since 
it opens for the possibility to obtain subsidy (Lynge Jensen 2002) 
 Alan Mc Culla presented some of the social problems they had experienced in the 
wake of the Recovery Plan: “Some decommissioned, some switched for prawn, and that is a 
problem. Some fishers retired, some have found other jobs. Cod closure has been a massive 
influence in undermining the profitability of the industry. Many have left the industry and the 
profitability is low, fleet is very dependant on emigrants from east of Europe. The fishers 
haven’t left the area, not a big place easy to commute. They have left the industry. A year ago 
we estimated that almost 30% of the crew members originated from Eastern Europe. If not for 
emigrant labour many of the trawlers would be tied up.” He also said that they had suggested 
more decommissioning, but that during the last six years there had only been two two 
schemes; one in 2001-2 and one in 2003-4. he continued: “According to EU and the FIGF 
(Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance) there should be plenty of money, and as far as 
I am concerned, they said they were going to allocate 1,5 million pounds new money. Two 
years later this new money has not come. Yes you are entitled to tie-up but it is your own 
government that is refusing.” He also explained that in 2001 calls went on for a tie up scheme 
compensation which was ignored. He explained in more detail: “(Some said we were lucky 
having our own government in Belfast) In 2001 we had a debate in parliament, everyone of 
the politicians spoke in favour of compensation, and everyone voted in favour of tie up. But 
after the debate was over minister went back to office and decided not to give tie up in 2001, 
2002 or 2003. In 2004 20 fishermen were rewarded tie up. In 2005 criteria were changed and 
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only 14 fishermen got it. In 2006 no tie up scheme. Still a piece of legislation from EU says 
that the government is allowed to pay, but government says no money is there. Big debate 
even as we speak.” Joe Maddock was also in favour of paying the fishermen to stay out of the 
fishery. He was also controversial enough to argued for taking out the efficient vessels instead 
of the inefficient since they are the biggest threat to the stock 
 Ciaran Kelly expressed his view of the social aspects of the Recovery Plan in this way: 
“I fully agree that management measures that tend to target only particular segments of the 
industry are unfair, of course they are! And if there are no compensation mechanisms in place 
then I think the one sector of the fishing has been penalised without compensation. I think that 
is a lot of the conflict which is ongoing at the moment with the Recovery Plan, people don’t 
think it is a level playing field.”  
 
 
Major points of discussion: 
 
- It seems to me as if scientists and the CFP agree that there is a need for drastic, 
permanent reduction in fishing effort in general, and this is what they are trying to 
achieve. At the same time the industry is looking for short time solutions just to get 
passed this unfavourable low stock size, and be ready when the stock is rebuilt. In such 
this may represent a ratchet effect. It does appear as though the two parties are 
speaking different languages when it comes to the future of the fleet. 
 
- When there are signals from the CFP that there is money available to get fishermen 
through this period of crisis, the industry feels conned when this money does not appear. 
This leads to distrust and loss of incentive to follow regulations constructed by the same 
agency.  
 
- Time and money is spent in order to hear what the stakeholders have to say, but it 
appears to me as management and bureaucrats know that they have to act contrary to 
the opinion of the industry in this particular case. So, arrangements to hear what the 
fishermen have to say may eventually become patronising because the industry may find 
that this is done because it is according to expectations and not to get their opinion.  
 
There seems to be a lack of coordination or interaction between those making the 
regulations and implementing them and the industry and this can be seen as two horses 
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4.7. The Northern Ireland proposition 
 
 Accurate reporting of bycatch and discards through observer programs are urgently 
needed to design a workable recovery plan. These data need to be made available in real time 
for monitoring the fishery as well as for stock assessment (Rosenberg and Mogensen 2002). 
All the people I interviewed (except for Ciaran Kelly where I brought it on before he had a 
chance to) including Barrie Deas talked about this initiative of Alan McCulla and the Anglo-
North Irish Fish Producers Organisation to a proposition that has been presented through the 
Irish Sea Working Group of the North-Western Waters Regional Advisory Council. This 
proposition is basically saying that in order to get around the vicious circle of low quotas 
leading to underreporting and discarding because the industry does not trust science, we need 
to do something new. The suggestion implies a discarding pilot scheme where during an 
initial period of two years Irish Sea fisheries would be invited to participate. The participation 
would include landing all commercial species caught under scientific monitoring. During the 
test period those participating would be under derogation from TACs and quotas and respond 
only to days at sea, and the goal would be to generate more accurate data on the stocks in the 
Irish Sea. This would indicate a strong cooperation between industry and scientists and this 
could prove fruitful in both directions (for the entire proposition see appendix _) 
 Joe Maddock was the first person to mention this proposition and he described it like 
this: “At first meeting of the Irish Sea sub-group. Alan came in and he would be arguing 
along different lines. Scientists saying they have lack of data. They need to get a clearer 
picture. Scientists say that if they don’t know figures, they will estimate ex bycatch. Alan is 
advocating that the vessels to fish without hindrance with an observer on board recording 
everything that is caught giving better input data. It has some merits.” Joe was however 
sceptical that this is a new mechanism to secure continued fishing.  
 Domnic Rihan first commented on an incident in the UK where Cefas (Centre for 
Environment, Fisheries & Aquaculture Science) got fishermen to register the catch, also called 
fishermen’s surveys, but the fishermen were arrested as they handed it over to Cefas This 
causes a credibility problem, and in his opinion as long as fishermen are being fined or 
imprisoned for having caught too many fish they will not be willing to show their records 
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easily. He continued: “And they would have the best records if we could have a collection. 
Alan MCCulla has the idea of trial fishery for two years and fishers will hand over all data, 
because they will be managed by days at se. They fish as much as they want for the days. And 
in this way test if you throw this over to the fishers themselves weather you will get clearer 
view of the stock. Fishermen have several regulations that they need to keep track of. You 
would need some level of scientific monitoring to get credibility. But it is…. I do not think the 
commission will burn, but it is not a bad idea.” Patricia Cominskey commented that the 
proposition has got positive feedback in first instance in the form of an initial conversation 
and the Commission said they are interested in hearing more.  
 According to Lórcan Ó Cinnéide the recovery measures are not working because the 
scientific advice remains the same: 0 fishing! According to him it is obvious that something 
different is called for: “Now, have you seen the northern Ireland proposal? Essentially the 
theory behind it is that scientists are continually complaining about the data lack. We have a 
different understanding from them on the reality. The quota applies more to the N-Ireland 
because they fish cod, but they have come up with proposal to put limit on effort only, without 
any qupota. And then you will get a true picture of the landings, fishing mortality and etc. So 
we can come up with a truer picture of what is going on. RAC has been positive to this, but we 
need to look at it more closely" 
 Ciaran Kellys comment on the proposition was:  “I do not consider weather this is 
possible or not, that is a mangers responsibility. Our best scientific advice at this moment is 
that the stock is at a very low level suffering from recruitment impairment. Opening the 
fishery in any form will be unadvisable purely from the point of view of the stock situation. We 
are not economists, sociologists we don’t know any other skills than looking at the biological 
parameters.” He also said that it was up to management to decide these things. But he 
emphasised that opening a fishery if the stock is low would be unadvisable because you could 
drive that stock to extinction: He also mentioned the responsibility that has been place upon 
managers by the Code of Conduct to bring all stocks to Bpa before 2012. He concluded: “the 
scientific advice will always be the best advice available. It is certainly. And it will say we 
cannot estimate with certainty. But we can say that the size of the stock is much lower than it 
was.” This is principally what Rosenberg and Mogensen also claimed in their WWF article 
from 2002, that when the stock is so low, any further increase in fishing may bring the stock 
further towards commercial extinction. 
 When I came to Kilkeel to interview Alan McCulla I was given a more thorough 
explanation of the background for the proposition:  “So, we debated the whole need for cod 
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recovery, disagreed the cod stock crisis. We needed to go and get a second opinion. We found 
Jon Kristjansson1 who had done some things in Scottland. We met with him and discussed 
with him. We laughed at first. But now maybe what Jon said was not as far out. So we brought 
him here and he made his own observations interviewed fishers met scientists and mangers in 
Belfast.” The culmination of this was a conference or workshop arranged by ANEFPO and 
held in Kilkeel where Jon Kristjansson was joined by Dr. Rick Officer from Ireland's Marine 
Institute, Sigurjon Thordarson, a Member of the Icelandic Parliament and Mr. Jorgen Niclasen, 
a Member of the Faeroese Parliament and the Faeroe's former Fisheries Minister (Report on 
the ANIFPO Workshop 2003) “In Marh 2003 the scientific observers came down to Kilkeel 
and they were met by 50 fishers protesting as a result of everything. Because of this the 
scientists were scared off coming.” Alan McCualla continued, “But we got another scientist 
from the Irish republic, Australian Rick Officer. They debated and neither beat one another. 
But it was increasingly obvious that the science behind the cod recovery plan and driving 
issues like quota is flawed and has many errors. This encouraged us to continue the fight. 
This continues now. We are encouraging fishermen to collect their own data. I was bored and 
sat up and read through all of ICES advice one night. How many times the ICES used lines 
words and phrases underlining the uncertainties was 77! The science is broke everyone 
admits it is broke. What can we do about it. We have come up with an idea. It has been 
approved in London, and it has been approved as a concept. To let the fleet go to sea and fish 
as much and land and declare all they get, and we can provide the science with all. After we 
can sit down with the scientists, and find the number of all the species, and see what the 
impact climate and fishing is causing. Afterwards we can adjust the situation and know it is 
based on accurate data, instead of the fantasy we are living now.”  
 Ciaran Kelly defended the role of the scientists saying: “I don’t know what people 
think science stands for, weather it is some kind of different moral than the industry would 
have about maintaining stocks at certain levels. I see science as having the function as purely 
giving advice to the stakeholders including the government and the industry about what it is 
we can measure and say about the state of the stocks. What we are asked to in terms of the 
P.A. is to frame that advice in relation to levels of risks which are associated with purely the 
events of something bad happening from a biological perspective, not from an economic or 
social perspective. So the element of scientific advice should and could only be necessarily 
one component of the considerations that as to how you should manage a fishery. I don’t 
think that fisheries should only be managed according to the scientific advice. I think always 
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a requirement for socio-economic considerations and the considerations of the society in 
large, so also non-governmental organisations and such.”  
 Alan McCulla expressed the interdependence between the scientists and the industry 
in this way: We need the science, I want to work with the scientists, I want to work with ICES. 
I need science, science need fishermen. They don’t trust us, and we trust them even less. This 
organisation is trying very hard to develop the trust. If after three years or whatever, we do 
come to an agreement that there are too many boats, If that’s the case, fine lets decommission. 
But we need to get to a level where we can be confident in science that we can agree that this 
is the situation in the Irish Sea….The marine institute scientist haven’t responded to the 
proposition. Our own scientist in Belfast and Uk agree with this.” 
 
Major points of discussion: 
 
- It appears as though the industry sees science as the cause of their problems because of 
the scientific recommendations. 
 
- The industry seems to have lost confidence in science, and this lack of confidence can 
be used as an argument for not complying with the rules.  
 
- The fisheries scientists may agree that science is uncertain but say that this is the 
information we have 
 
- Scientists say that their advice should only be one part upon what management should 
be based. Then why is the industry so afraid of the science? 
 
- If opening the fishery to a test period could be detrimental to the stock, not being able 
to get past the large amount of unreported catch that scientists are claiming may be 
huge, may be equally detrimental. Underreporting will naturally not happen during 
such a test period as described above.  
 
- The Irish Sea may be a very suitable area for doing such a discarding pilot scheme 
since it is surveyable because of its geographical and natural configuration, the industry 
is restricted and there is already a lot of information about the Sea. 
 
 
4.8. General points  
 
 The actual cod recovery plan was implemented in 2004, thus it has lasted for almost 2 
years. The estimated time frame for recovery of the stock is 5-10 years. But many people are 
claiming that the plan, in fact all of those I spoke to said this either directly or indirectly, is 
not working. According to the article written by Kelly, the plan doesn’t work largely because 
of the derogations given. This was also partly the opinion of Dominic Rihan and Lorcan Ó 
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Cinneide. According to Ciaran Kelly the big problem is that no one knows how to evaluate 
the plan. He explained that in order to implement a plan to improve the cod stock you need 
objectives and you need a suite of actions that you can carry out and you need to be able to 
measure the actions. He uses the goal of the Recovery Plan to have the stock level increased 
by 30 % by the end of each year as an example: “you cannot possibly measure the result. You 
need to set objectives that you can measure. Another fallacy people believe is that all you 
need is a fancy model. They are good ways of explaining complicated interactions and to 
make a model clear you have to simplify and this is done by making assumptions and the more 
assumptions the more uncertainty. Or you can make them more and more complex in order to 
get rid of the uncertainty.”  
 Ciaran Kelly also mentioned that the communication of risk is not well between what 
scientists do and what the managers decisions are: “So, in other words we made a point of this: 
if you have an objective for instance, simplistic models of the Irish Sea situation. We looked at 
the risk that different management decisions would end in the stock being below the Bpa or 
not achieving above it. The Recovery Plan tries to limit the fluctuation with 15% each year. 
You are such actually increasing the risk that the stock will not recover. You are maintaining 
a high level of fishing. The managers need to make an assessment of the risk. Science would 
say that under a strategy for recovery of cod you can introduce as many measures as possible, 
but when you allow fishing to take place you increase the risk.” He said this in the wake of 
commenting on the article he wrote together with his co-workers where they indicate that the 
derogations may have constituted a large part of the reason why the cod recovery plan has not 
resulted in a large increase in cod, or in other words have not reached its goals.  
 In 2003 as the stock did not show signs of improvement, an official plan was decided 
on. If the interim measures had been working, there would be no need for a Cod Recovery 
Plan, so the question is if it is right to include the three years of interim measures into the 









Chapter 5. Analysis 
 
 
Even though the emphasis of this thesis will not be on the theoretical analysis, rather 
on observing and retelling what has actually happened, I will make an effort to look at the cod 
recovery process with reference to the theory that was dealt with in chapter 2.  
 
5.1. Summary: the cod recovery process- an area of conflict 
  
 The state of the cod stock in the Irish Sea was towards the end of the 90´s so bad that 
in 2000 the European Commission established measures to aid recovery. The stock was said 
to be below the safe limit BBlim which was 6000 tonnes. The first consequence was a severe 
reduction of the cod TAC. Then a fishery closure was introduced of an area stretching across 
the Irish Sea in order to let as many cod as possible spawn. The period of closure was between 
14  of February (15  in 2001) to 30  of April. The area was modified and made smaller only 
reaching from the east coast of Northern Ireland/Ireland towards the Isle of Man (for map see 
appendix X) in 2001. The Northern Irish fishermen felt that they were the ones hit hardest by 
this closure since it was placed “right outside their doorstep” in the area where most fishing 
was done, and in the period when most fishing was done. Derogations were provided for 
fishing for nephrops (Norway lobster) in certain areas of the closed box. This was because of 
the severe impact the closures would otherwise have on the industry and because this fishery 
was considered more harmless to the cod stock.  
th th th
 In order to check the bycatch of cod, BIM carried out a major programme in the Irish 
Sea in 2000 and designed a new separator panel to allow escapement of cod from nephrops 
trawls (Rihan and McDonnell 2003). So, the closure was followed up by technical measures 
giving instructions of what kind of gear and devices that was and was not allowed applied in 
the fishery. The background was that fishing for shrimp, nephrops and flatfish should be 
allowed to take place, representing as little harm to the cod as possible. Because of pressure 
from the industry each consecutive year from 2000 until 2003, the closure included more 
derogation with more technical instructions.  
 So far the measures applied had been temporary ones, but there were signals that the 
cod stock was not improving. In 2003 in the wake of the reform of the CFP, and as the stock 
was still estimated to under BBlim, the Commission decided it was time to cut to the chase and 
implement a recovery plan involving the application of a system of more and stricter 
measures. In February 2004, the European Union introduced regulatory measures aiming at an 
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increase in the quantity of mature fish to more than 10,000t over the next five to ten years. 
These measures included harvest control rules for the setting of total allowable catch (TAC), 
fishing effort limitation (number of days at sea and gear restrictions) and restrictions on 
landing ports, stowage and transport of cod.  The closed area was kept and the technical 
measures were applied both to the effort restriction scheme and the closed area. The yearly 
objective of the harvest control rule was to increase the stock by 30% towards the end of each 
year compared to the beginning. 
 The interim measures were tailored for the Irish Sea Cod Stock, but the official plan 
involved measures that were to be implemented in all the CFP areas where cod recovery was 
called for. So, it involved one recipe for all the areas where numbers were modified to fit the 
particular stocks.  
 Prior to the cod recovery plan EU had held out expectations for economic 
compensation for those who were affected hardest. This money was allocated to the Member 
States but as a total package, and not earmarked for this purpose. It has bee up to the Member 
States themselves to distribute this money. According to people within the industry they have 
seen little of this compensation, aside from a couple of decommissioning and tie-up schemes.  
 According to science unreported catch of cod in this area is extensive and assumed to 
be affecting the recovery of the cod. This has probably increased since the recovery program 
started because it is often a result of reduced quotas. Control of the fisheries is up to Member 
States to conduct, and although EU calls the situation a crisis, Member States may not take 
the necessary steps.  
 The result of the cod crisis on the industry has been some vessels scrapped some 
switching to take advantage of the nephrops derogations and displacement to other areas 
further away (The Stock Book 2005). In addition the future prospects are putting a constraint 
on the industry making it hard to be a fisherman.  
 The cod recovery period (2000 to 2006) has caused a lot of anger, frustration and 
confrontation from within the industry. In 2003 Northern Irish fishermen physically denied 
scientists access to the catch because of the frustration of the continuously decreasing TACs. 
As long as the crisis measures applied included closed areas, technical measures and reduced 
TACs the Irish Industry was not strongly affected. But in 2004 as the effort restrictions came 
along including all who fished in the Irish Sea, Irish fishing industry arranged a day of action 
as a protest against “Days at Sea.” 
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 There have been arranged hearings where fishermen and the industry have been able 
to present their points of view, but the impression is that they have been heard but not listened 
to.  
 
5.2. The Irish Sea cod crisis- a wicked problem? 
 
 One criticism of managers has been that they leave it up to science to decide on 
controversial matters. Scientists base their analysis on scientific procedures in order to solve 
what can be referred to as tame problems. The solutions to such problems will be suitable to 
deal with the biological problem in isolation, but cannot represent the resolution that is 
required to wicked problems. This is bound to result in wicked conflicts because the 
resolution will fail to deal with the drivers of the problem. It is however not as straight 
forward as this, because There is one critique of the application of this theory in this context 
since fisheries science has been very little known for having straight-forward problems. After 
the introduction of the Ecosystem approach, this situation is deteriorated because of the lack 
of competence that is a basis for actually managing according to this approach. In such the 
theory may not be a perfect fit, but it provides an interdisciplinary platform from which to 
address the conflict. 
 In order to refresh the theory of chapter 2 a short summary should be in place. One 
can distinguish between two types of problems or conflicts according to Rittel and Webber 
(1973): tame and wicked. The first describes problems that are dealt with in the natural 
sciences, where you have a right or wrong answer and the problem solver will know when the 
solution is found. Evaluation of the solution is straightforward.  The second characterises 
problems for which there is no definite formulation, there is no true or false answer only good 
or bad solutions and in the formulation of the solution lays the formulation of the problem. 
The nature and understanding of the problem will differ depending on the position of the 
problem solver. There are no criteria to tell when a solution has been reached and evaluation 
of the solution is very problematic because of the consequences that the implementation of the 
solution may aggregate. Each wicked problem is unique so there is no learning from trial-and-
error, and there is a lack of predefined potential set of solutions which makes it important not 
to know too early what solution to apply. Problems can be described as discrepancy between 
what is and what should have been, and in removing one cause for the discrepancy, it may 
have been a symptom for a higher-level problem that will appear. There will always be many 
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stakeholders involved in wicked problems each with a subjective world-view deciding how to 
explain the problem, and consecutively the nature of the resolution.  
 The cod crisis in the Irish Sea may be described as a tame problem as long as it is on 
the table of the scientists because it will only involve the one dimension of it namely that 
there is too few cod in the Irish Sea. The scientist can then go through different scenarios and 
find a solution that will fix the problem purely from a biological point of view. This is the 
privilege of the scientist and he can now present the problem along with his proposed solution 
to the public. The argument here is that in society the Irish Sea cod crisis is a wicked problem 
because of many factors that will be dealt with in the following text. First: there is no definite 
formulation of the problem. Let us try one formulation: too heavy fishing on the cod has 
resulted in depletion of the stock, this is probably true, but only on small part of it all Second 
of all the solution lies in the formulation of the problem and is to reduce fishing, secondly this 
is only one presentation of the problem, and the presentation of the problem will change 
depending on the presenter. If you ask a fisherman he might say that there is no crisis and the 
solution is business as usual. If you ask a politician he might say that the cod crisis is about 
people loosing their jobs, and the solution may be find other employment and so on. In order 
to illustrate this in this particular context, I will present to you the proposed solutions and thus 
also the personal view of the problem of my informants: 
Joe Maddock seemed to think that the industry would regulate itself according to the 
resource crisis. “The amazing thing is that fishermen keep fishing, those who cannot deal get 
out of the industry. People fish as long as it is economically defyable, and no-one can meddle 
with this reality”  
Intervention is the problem 
 
Dominic Rihan said that we need to go from TACs and Quota system to purely effort 
regulated management supplied by selective gear: “TAC and quota system this has not 
worked, effort control is much simpler also for inspector control. I think they should be 
looking at effort control with technical conservation, gear has developed a lot, it is not easy 
but achievable to adapt gear to target fish and species much better.” 
The TAC and Quota system is the problem 
 
Lorcan O cinneidre said that we need to change the system and get good planning and 
get rid of unreported catches. “It is obvious to us that we need something different.” “We 
do not have confidence that pulling out livelihoods based on what we know today.” 
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The management system is the problem 
 
Alan McCulla is trying to debate science because he doesn’t believe there is a crisis. His 
solution would be to get science and fishermen together in the quest of scientific results 
that can be clear to both fishermen and scientists: “That science is based on data provided 
by the fishermen and now the fishers are not allowed to fish. So how can we provide the 
scientists with data?” If after three years or whatever, we do come to an agreement that there 
are too many boats, if that’s the case then fine let’s decommission!” 
Science is the problem 
 
Ciaran Kelly thinks the solution to the managerial problems is higher degree of 
transparency into the work of the scientists. A solution to the scientific challenge would 
be to move towards models that can grasp uncertainty and give ideas to the trends of the 
stocks instead of one concrete answer to the size of the stock: “I think the first thing we 
need it trust, and trust comes from transparency. I am not a fisherman but I can see that if I 
was looking at the system by which the stocks are assessed there are a lot of stuff that is not 
transparent to me. I am not present, I am not invited. The first interaction a fisherman gets is 
the quota suggestions in December. Oh my god, that’s what happens this year, and that may 
be a shock. That process takes an entire year and a lot of meetings. There should be a lot 
more openness” “One side of science want to get the models as complicated as possible in 
order to get rid of errors. We are saying lets forget about it, look instead at the major factors 
here. This means we can no longer manage according to TAC and MSY.”   
The scientific models and the non-transparent nature of science is the problem (Kelly 
and Codling 2006) 
  
 There is no definite formulation of the overall problem here and therefore there are no 
true or false answers only possible solutions, and the understanding and nature of the problem 
differs from person to person. This problem includes many wreathed factors such as values of 
the actors involved, practical obstacles, socio-economic concerns, financial concerns, market 
concerns and so on and so forth. Naturally any effort to solve it will have effect in many 
layers.   
 In order to see weather it is possible to evaluate a solution to this problem, let us try 
this one: we implement a system that is going to reduce fishing on the depleted stock. The 
possible evaluations might be: “…. I think it is a good solution because if this happens, there 
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will be some fishers that will be unemployed, and the industry will be struggling for a while, 
but we might get a permanent downscaling of the fishing fleet and this is good, and there will 
be some protesting but as people can see that this is working, everyone will be happy 
eventually….”  The problem is that the possible effects of this solution are limitless. Trial and 
error is not an option because as soon as you try something out, there will already be many 
consequences that cannot be undone. We cannot either go to look for similar situations 
because there will always be some differences that can blow the whole solution.  
 In removing one cause of discrepancy of a wicked problem it may have been a 
symptom for a higher-level problem that will appear. In order to shed light on how one 
solution can result in revelation of unexpected, higher-level problems, I will present another 
example from the field work: One part of the solution to the overall cod crisis was to close an 
area to fishing for the cod spawning season. This area was positioned where mostly Northern 
Irish boats fished. This uncovered a new problem because the northern Irish said this was 
unfair. As a solution to this problem, derogations were given to the nephrops fishers. But the 
real nature of the problem started to unravel as complaints did not stop, and the next was that 
the Northern Irish protested against the low quota and the technical measures and so on. The 
higher level problem was that the measures hit hardest in a region that already had a history of 
being unjustly affected, it cut to the quick. In this case the quick is represented by Northern 
Ireland. Because they constitute such a small fraction of the UK fishing fleet there may be a 
tendency of dealing with other interests before the ones of Northern Ireland. In addition an old 
resolution provides for increased allocation of quota to Ireland when stocks are low, on the 
expense of Northern Ireland. This resolution is also beneficial to UK, but in other areas that in 
the Irish Sea and both Ireland and UK will fight in order to keep it. The consequence of this 
may have been increased frustration for the Northern Irish fishermen, leading to an already 
present hostility to measures. This may play an overriding part in fishermen denying scientists 
access to the catch, and increased public effort to fight the recovery plan.  The indirect result 
may have been reduced incentive to follow regulations resulting in for instance increase in 
unreported catch. In general I guess it is appropriate to say that there is one problem present 
here that is on a very high level, and that is the CFP, or rather the malfunctions of it. One 
example is the control of fisheries measures tat is left to the Member Sates and therefore 
highly uncertain and arbitrary.  
 The cod crisis is a resource-based political conflict and based on the above analysis 
we can call it a wicked problem or conflict. In such a conflict it is important to reveal the 
drivers in order to find workable resolutions. 
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5.3. The drivers of the Irish Sea “cod recovery conflict” 
 
 According to Martin Nie there are several factors that play a part in making natural 
resource-based conflicts very controversial. Looking at the implementation of the cod 
recovery plan as such a conflict, it will be analysed here with reference to Nies drivers of 
conflict that were addressed in the theory chapter. 
 Scarcity: If there were plenty of cod inn the Irish Sea there would of course not be a 
recovery program and thus also not a recovery conflict. So, the whole basis for this conflict is 
scarcity, and scarcity to a point where scientists and conservationists fear that the evolution 
process is at stake. The more scarce the more valuable the resource is, and the more 
considerations and voices need to be taken into consideration. There are too many boats 
fishing too few cod in the Irish Sea and this can represent an over-appropriation, and the fact 
that the stock is assumed to be so small proposes large challenges to finding a resolution. The 
derogations that were given may be referred to as compromises and can be seen as a result of 
collaborative management since fishers have pushed for these derogations and which been 
granted to them. This may have lead to conservationist feeling that there have been too many 
compromises, and soon there might not be any cod to compromise. Too many people want too 
much of this resource and this proposes a major challenge to finding a resolution 
 Policy surrogate: The Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan has been used as a political 
surrogate for discussing the Common Fisheries Policy and the regionalisation of fisheries 
management in general. In this way this problem has become a multidimensional conflict 
involving many different interests.  
 The sacred and spiritual, and importance of place: I think that the fishermen in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland are bound by old and strong traditions to the areas of fisheries, as is the 
case many other places. This is one of the factors that make resource conflicts so intense 
because they often involve change of activity or change of traditional place of living, making 
the effects very painful.  
 Policy design: There is at least one “Lord of yesterday” present in this conflict and it 
is the Hague Preference. It is a resolution that had its merits a long time ago when times were 
different, but now has lost its meaning. Still it persists and contributes to increase the feeling 
of fraudulent preference which in turn leads to less confidence in the management system. 
Such lack of trust may lead to poor incentives to follow rules and eventually may undermine 
the effect of the recovery plan.  
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 Policy frames: According to Nie policy frames can be seen as a type of story that is 
told by various political actors. This case study is a testimony of this with regard to the cod 
recovery process where the emphasis and points of views altered slightly from one informant 
to another. In addition there were underlying stories that I could reveal only after thorough 
analysis and additional reading of information. There is one particular frame problem that I 
would like to point to however, and that concerns the future prospects of the fishing fleet. 
There seems to be two opposing frames as to what is one of the main solutions to the resource 
scarcity depending on if you talk to the industry or relate to the view of the CFP and ICES and 
many others. The former seems to be awaiting better times, trying to stick it out through the 
bad times, and then when the cod returns they are ready to get back into business.  This can be 
referred to as a ratchet effect. The latter parties are working towards a permanent reduction in 
the fishing fleet, not only in the Irish Sea but almost everywhere. It is important to develop 
common interpretations of a conflict, why it occurs, the motivation for the parties involved 
and how it should be settled (Nie). This may be a reason why the industry doesn’t think much 
of the consultation exercises arranged for the fishers to have a voice, because afterwards the 
government go home and do whatever they want. This discrepancy in interpretation can make 
such activities a waste of time and money.  
 Scientific disagreement and uncertainty: The scientific background for the Cod 
Recovery plan has been questioned because of the high degree of uncertainty that prevail in 
the input data of the assessments. The Northern Irish fishing industry has called for a second 
opinion on the so called cod crisis, because they do not believe there is a fisheries induced 
crisis. Nie is warning against turning conflicts into science wars because value-and interest 
based political conflicts may be framed as scientific ones. The scientific language is 
complicated and the scientific uncertainty makes matters worse because it makes every 
decision into a risky business. Science should have their place in decision making but we 
should not leave it up to science to resolve problems. It is my opinion that the role of science 
in decision making has changed in many areas of fisheries management. This may be due to 
the harsh and unpopular decision that is required from mangers, and it is easier to blame it on 
science but therefore also putting science forth as something that can be debated.  
 Another aspect that should be mentioned concerning science is that very often the 
focus is on basic science and this is because of the scientific system where prestige and 
money lies therein. This provides few incentives for scientists to engage in applied research 
projects.  
 80
 Electoral politics and wedge issues: In this particular context it is difficult for me to 
point to specific incidents where the cod recovery program has been used as political wedge 
in one direction or the other although I am certain it has. Alan McCualla for instance, said in 
his interview: “It is more attractive for the politicians to say well stop the fishermen. Green 
movements arguing with the politicians, the most votes will come from the once sympathetic 
to the green companies, and not from the fishing community.”   
 Political and interest group strategy: If you search the net for WWF cod recovery you 
will find an endless number of hits. Many of these deal with the necessity of making tough 
decisions in order to save the cod stock. Although it is admirable that someone is speaking up 
for threatened species, one should always be careful not to include the money aspect into this 
industry. There have been tendencies in the past of green movements leaning a little too far 
towards where the money lies, thus offering a biased, but often apparently well-documented, 
presentation of reality. The same accounts for media. On 3rd of November there was an article 
in one of the biggest Newspapers in Norway “Dagbladet” with the title: “In 50 years the sea 
will be empty” The article is, obviously, about the poor condition that prevails for the fish in 
the world seas, and that the industry needs to take more action towards reducing the fleets. 
One of the arguments put forth in the article is that in 200 years, 40% of the species have 
disappeared from the sea. This sounds horrific and it may be true, but it is taken out of context 
and if we could see the context it might not sound so scary. I am not saying that the 
newspaper article is not right, just that it is very easy to take things out of context and out of 
proportion and present the worst parts of the worst parts. This is an example of the media 
constructing a frame that excludes alternatives and makes it unfit for public discourse. Media 
involvement in wicked conflicts has a tendency to increase biased impressions and increased 
confusion. And of course in the media it is about selling, because this is the way to get money.  
 Constitutional, statutory and administrative language: This point includes introducing 
vague and changing management philosophies differing in interpretation depending on who 
interprets them. The ecosystem approach and the Precautionary approach play major parts in 
the recovery programs and they can both be applied to the above definition. But there are 
concrete results of both of these approaches set into the management. Ecosystem approach is 
the background for adjusting fisheries for all species according to the cod. Most cod in the 
Irish Sea is taken in mixed fisheries so this is a logic decision as long as one cannot fish on 
isolated species. This is one example of the ecosystem being usable. The precautionary 
approach also plays a concrete role here, because the reference points upon which the 
recovery program has been built are the precautionary reference points. So both approaches 
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put into practice. But the precautionary approach is said to force decisions based upon what 
we don’t know instead of what we do know, it also may create a sense of time lag from crisis 
is called for until the real crisis occurs, and create an even larger degree of uncertainty in the 
scientific advices. In other words it contributes to increase confusion and decrease confidence 
in management. Another aspect of the approach as Ciaran Kelly said is that it sets out to avoid 
undesirable outcome, but the undesirable outcome is defined from the point of view of the 
fish and not from the people living from it.  
 The ecosystem approach is “a strategy for the integrated management of land, water 
and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way.”  
This is as vague as it can get, but there are many recipes on management according to the 
ecosystem approach. This is actually the problem, that its applicability is so vague that it can 
be used almost anywhere, also as a cover-up for continuing usual practice. Another problem is 
that the approach requires revealing the entire ecological aspect of exploited species, its prey, 
its predator, responses to different conditions, migration patterns, regeneration patterns, 
feeding patterns etc, in other words an impossible task. But we should at least strive towards 
this knowledge. Ciaran Kelly also commented on the ecosystem approach saying that this will 
require micromanaging of stocks and this is difficult to obtain under the present management 
approaches. In order to have the precondition for ecosystem approach we need to move to a 
different management paradigm.  
 The vague nature of the ecosystem approach may lead to abuse, or at least suspicion 
of abuse (Corkeron 2006).  
  Distrust: In every level of the cod recovery process I could reveal some sort of distrust, 
and as Nie puts forth; distrust is a driver of conflict because it undermines constructive debate, 
and problem solving. In this particular case the Northern Irish distrusted the Irish incentives to 
support the recovery plan, and they felt that Ireland was able to influence the design of it. - the 
managers do not trust the Commission because they have made some strange decision 
counteracting other decisions, signalling they do not understand the complete picture - science 
and managers do not trust the fishermen’s incentives not to underreport catch – industry does 
not trust science because of uncertainties and such principles as the precautionary approach – 
fishermen, managers, the Commission and science itself does not trust the scientific approach 
used in assessments, but it is “what we have” – the Northern Irish fishing industry have little 
trust in the government – Joe Maddock suspects the Northern Irish proposition is just an 
excuse to keep fishing – fisheries scientists distrust the ability of technological devises to 
work – the uncertainty of the measures applied leads to distrust in their ability to accomplish 
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the goals and so on and so forth. As Lorcan O Cinnedire put it: “We do not have confidence 
that pulling out livelihoods based on what we know today”  
 Everyone except for Dominic Rihan however, had faith in the ability of the Regional 
Advisory Councils to make things better.  
  
5.4. Conflict in political perspective 
 
 I think it is obvious that the cod recovery conflict is driven by both competing internal 
values and external political ones, but I have the impression that the as the process has moved 
along, the internal values have to some degree been put aside. I think this may be a result of 
the different parties acknowledging that they are all affected and maybe the RAC providing 
an arena for the parties to meet, and this may also lead to some trust developing. Now we 
have analysed the first step of the resolution process according to Nie, and the verdict is that 
as the conflict appears today it is more a matter of external factors.  
 Secondly, the role of the administrator or manager in this conflict should be revealed 
and this is one area I cannot say too much about. Maybe this is actually saying enough, 
namely that in my field work I have not been able to reveal their role here. Well, the role of 
the Commission is clear enough, they have made the recovery program, but the national 
administrators and managers I have missed, of course partly because I was not able to get an 
interview with any of those. But in general in my opinion, it seems as though science has been 
given a bit too much of the responsibility and from this we could try and suggest that 
management is hiding behind science.  
 In any case, thinking of this conflict in terms of drivers might facilitate in finding the 
solution because we can find the weak spots and generate action here.  
There are for instance, several places suggested that science is the main problem of this 
conflict. As Nie writes: if  a conflict is driven primarily by scientific disagreement the first 
step would be to reveal if this is actually the case, or if it is just framed as such. But if it is the 
case he suggests applying some tools such as adaptive management strategies, civic science or 
collaborative monitoring. All include collaboration between stakeholders, managers and 
science. Maybe the Northern Irish proposition is as close as you can get to a good resolution 
of this contentious affair. If it turns out that this is only an attempt to frame a value-based 
conflict as a scientific one, then it is better to go straight on to the point of telling each other 
what we like.   
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 In any case what I think Nies drivers of conflicts together with Ritter and Webbers 
tame and wicked problems has shed light on, is that each single effort to reveal and introduce 
resolution into the public arena, is and must therefore be treated as, unique. This is why one 
pattern for all is not a good solution to such resource based natural conflicts. The starting 
points of each area are different in terms of different political drivers, and therefore the 
responses to a resolution will be different. In this particular case the overall goal is getting the 
cod stock above reference points. Because this process involves human conduct, human 
distress, human interplay, human problems etc, the management resolutions must include 
human aspects. Or they must eliminate the human factor, which is stopping all fishing activity.  
  
5.5. Evaluation of the Research questions against the empirical and theoretical findings. 
  
 Based on the conclusions drawn during the empirical review and the theoretical 
discussion which has been applied on the Cod Recovery Plan, I would like to present an 
answer to the research questions posed in chapter 1.  
 
1. Is the Irish Sea Cod Recovery Plan likely to achieve its objectives of rebuilding the 
cod stock? 
 
- There are no signs that the spawning stock biomass or the stock in total show 
increase worth mentioning 
 
- The interviews call attention to underreporting 
 
- Apart from”Days at Sea” there are few indications that the applied measures 
have contributed to limit the fishery and thus rebuild the stock. 
 
- Bycatch comprises the large part of the cod taken to port and there are few 
indications of reduction in bycatch due to the measures applied  
 
- The scientific (biological and ecological) advices have ended up in political 
horse-trading instead of efficient action.  
 
- In addition to this, I refer to my main conclusion of the empirical chapter 
regarding TACs: the result of these factors may be that TAC and quotas have 
become obstacles to cod recovery during the Cod Recovery Plan 
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 These findings appear to be confirmed by the theory I have chosen, indicating that 
they are common and general, and this strengthens the credibility of the analysis. Nies drivers 
can be identified several places in the empirical part. This accounts for drivers like “scarcity”, 
“political surrogate,” policy design”, ”policy frames”, ”scientific disagreement and 
uncertainty,” ”distrust” and ”Constitutional , statuary and administrative language”. 
Based on the above mentioned empirical findings, my conclusion is that it is doubtful that the 
objectives of the Cod Recovery Plan of rebuilding the cod stock have been reached and it is 
probable that the objectives will no be reached with the present form of the plan.  
 
 
2. What aspects interfere with the objectives of the Recovery Plan? 
This research question can be illuminated by the following empirical and theoretical findings: 
 
- The main problem is that the plan has become too complex: too many 
measures with too little effect, continuous changing of rules and regulations in 
order to adjust to the gravity of the situation, contrasts of interests combined 
with poor communication between interests. In addition the new goals of 
Precautionary approach and Ecosystem approach lead to increased complexity. 
- The issue is not important enough o achieve the interest in the fisheries policy 
of UK, which directs its efforts towards the areas of high economic importance. 
- The Irish interests differ from those of Northern Ireland in this matter and 
Ireland can invoke on the Hague preference when quotas are low.  
- The cod fishery of the Irish Sea constitutes in large part bycatch something that 
complicates matters because you cannot just stop all fishing activity in this 
area.  
- “The reallocation of efforts seem to result in increased bycatch of cod” 
- “There are indications that control, surveillance and enforcement of the 
recovery plan is not conducted to such a degree required in order to get the 
wanted results”. “Making laws and regulations without enforcing them is not 
very efficient”. 
- Scientists and industry appear to have opposing interests and lacking the ability 
to cooperate, or they actually work against each other. 
- The CFP measures (decommissioning, financial support etc) implemented in 
order to get fishers out of the fishery are not working.  
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- There seems to be a lack of coordination or interaction between those making 
the regulations and implementing them and the industry. “There is no 
confidence in the management system.” 
- “The industry seems to have lost confidence in science and this lack of 
confidence can be used as argument for not complying with rules” 
- Underreporting takes place without anyone appearing to do something about it.  
 
 As was the case for the first research question, the theoretical concepts of the chosen 
theory support and confirm the empirical findings. All the above mentioned theoretical 
concepts can be applied and increase the depth of the empirical insight. If I was to emphasise 
one factor, that indirectly influences the process to such a degree that it nearly sums up the 
empirical findings, it will have to be distrust. It seems as though no one trusts anyone. In 
addition to contribute to the present situation, this factor helps reveal that unless something is 
done, the future prospects are bleak.  
 One of the theoretical drivers of conflict was the different levels that needed to be 
revealed, and the resolution should be dealing with a high a level as possible. The control 
issue together with the absence of supervision may point to the Common Fisheries 
Management as a higher level problem in this particular case. .  
 My answer to the second research question is that all those aspects mentioned above 




5.6. Future prospects of the Cod Recovery Plan 
  
 There are ways out of the tunnel and first of all a thorough evaluation is called for. 
Holm and Nielsen (2006) has written an article dealing with the evaluation of fisheries 
management processes. They provide a model that can be the starting point for such an 
evaluation:  
 
1. Selecting criteria of merit - Finding the goals and values to evaluate against. 
2. Setting standards of performance, i.e. levels that must be exceeded to obtain a certain 
value term - setting of some standards of comparison that the investigated object must 
exceed in order to be valued as good or bad.  
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3. Collecting data pertaining to the performance of the object under evaluation on the 
criteria relative to the standards - in order to link the evaluated object to a certain 
standard, there is a need for measurement instruments. This is a challenge when 
dealing with fisheries because of the technical difficulties in providing accurate 
information on the state of fish stocks 
4. Integrating results into a final value judgement – this is a difficult task since very 
advanced evaluation forms may have inbuilt biases, while a less advanced system will 
be too weak against the prejudice and idiosyncrasies of the evaluator.  
 (Holm and Nielsen 2006) 
 
Scientists and Fishermen need to initiate a new cooperation where fishermen are 
involved in the scientific assessments and scientists are involved in the fishery. This is the 
only way to get past the vicious circle that locks the situation today. The Northern Ireland 
Proposition can provide a very useful possibility for doing this, because there are so many 
positive factors in place already. First of all this initiative comes from within the industry and 
this should increase incentives, secondly the sea area should provide a very suitable place for 
trying out such an assessment program and thirdly the RAC is in place which can be an 
initiator of the project.  By fishing with effort control as the primary measure, assessing and 
registering everything that is caught, the problem of underreporting would dissapear and 
because the initiative lies within the industry self-justice will provide for compliance.  
 The RAC provides new opportunities. It can for instance contribute in making the 
system less unjust and initiate in an evaluation of the Cod Recovery Plan.  
 Finally, there is a need for further research to follow up the Cod Recovery Plan, that 
should include social and managerial aspects in addition to biological and ecological.  
Because this is a new system of tools worldwide in connection with fisheries resource crisis 
there is a need to learn as much as possible from the implementation for future practice and 
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Table A: basis for cod and hake recovery measures in EU 2003 
 (from: amended proposal for a Council Regulation COM(2002)773 final 2001/0299) 
Concerned fish 
stocks 
Target level in 
tonnes 
Estimated stock 




rate if stock below 
target level 
Cod in the Kattegat 10 500 6 400 0,60 0,23
Cod in the North 
Sea, Skagerrak and 
Eastern Channel 
15 000 60 000 0,65 0,22
Cod to the West of 
Scotland 
22 000 14 000 0,60 0,16
Cod in the Irish Sea 10 000 6 000 0,72 0,26
Hake – Northern 
area 

























Appendix II: Details closed are and technical measures  
 
Table B : The measures of 2000-2003 Irish Sea cod recovery plans in detail: 
2000: From the 14th of  February to the 30th of April a defined area is closed to all 
fishing with any demersal trawl, seine or similar towed net, any gill net, trammel net 
or similar static net, or any fishing gear incorporating hooks:  
Area: 53°15´N, 05°00´W; 54°00´N, 05°00´W; 54°00´N, 04°00´W; 53°30´N, 
04°00´W (red area on the map) 
derogation: Fishing is permitted with a prawn net in the areas of the closed boxes 
coloured green provided that a minimum of 35% live weight of prawns (Nephrops) 
is on board; only one mesh size range is carried on board, 70-79 or 80-99.; no mesh 
in any part of the nets is greater than 300mm 
 
2001: From the 15th of  February to the 30th of April a defined area is closed to all 
fishing with any demersal trawl, seine or similar towed net, any gill net, trammel net, 
tangle net or similar static net, or any fishing gear incorporating hooks 
Area: 54°30´N, 04°50´W; 53°15´N, 04°50´W ( red area on the map) 
Derogation 1: fishing is permitted with a prawn net (demersal otter trawl) in the area 
of the closed box coloured green provided: a minimum of 35% of live weight of 
prawn is on board; only one mesh size range is carried on board (70-79mm or 80-
99mm); no other type of gear is carried on board; no mesh in any part of the net is 
greater than 300mm. 
Derogation 2: fishing is permitted with a prawn net (separator trawl) in the yellow 
area provided that; in addition to the above it complies with the conditions made for 
the green zone; it includes an inclined separator panel; if the total weight of cod 
retained on board is greater than 18% of the total catch, the vessel must stop fishing 
in this area for at least 24 hours. 
Derogation 3: fishing is permitted with semi-pelagic trawl in a certain area from 15th 
of April to 24th of March provided: The nets used are 100mm diamond mesh size as 
a minimum; the nets incorporate at least 500 individual meshes of mesh size at least 
300mm; if the total weight of cod retained on board is greater than 15% of the total 
catch, the vessel must stop fishing in this area for at least 24 hours. 
On at least 50 fishing voyages, observers shall be present on board fishing vessels 
deploying either semi-pelagic trawls or separator trawls registering the catch 
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2002: From the 14th of February to the 30th of April a defined area is closed to all 
fishing with any demersal trawl, seine or similar towed net, any gill net, trammel net, 
tangle net or similar static net or any fishing gear incorporating hooks. 
Area: 54°30´N, 04°50´W; 54°15´N, 04°50´W (red area on the map) 
Derogation 1: fishing is permitted with a prawn net (demersal otter trawl) in the area 
of the closed box coloured green provided: no other type of fishing gear is retained 
on board; only one mesh size range is carried on board (70-79mm or 80-99mm); no 
mesh in any part of the net is greater than 300mm 
Derogation 2: fishing is permitted with a prawn net (separator trawl) shall be 
permitted in the entire box provided that; in addition to the above it complies with 
the conditions made for the green zone; it includes an inclined separator panel 
Derogation 3: fishing with demersal otter trawls of mesh size 80-99mm shall be 
permitted even if  the entire upper half of the anterior part of such a net does not 
consist of a panel of netting material attached directly to the headline of the net, 
extending towards the posterior of the net for at least 15 meshes and constructed of 
diamond-meshed netting material of which no individual mesh is of mesh size less 
than 140 mm; nor a square-meshed panel of mesh size of at least 80 mm is included 
in such a net, as are the conditions laid down in Article 7 of Regulation (EC) No 
850/98; provided that the catch on board consists of at least 85% scallops and only 
5% of cod . 
Derogation 4: it shall be allowed to carry on board or deploy beam trawl of mesh 
size equal to, or greater than, 80mm as long as the entire upper half of the anterior 
part consists of a panel of diamond-meshed netting material of which no individual 
mesh is of mesh size less than 180mm attached directly to the headline or to no more 
than three rows of netting material of any mesh size attached to the headline. The 
extent of the panel shall be decided by a specific recipe. 
 
 
2003: the same technical measures applies as for 2002! 
 






Table C: details of technical measures of the 2002 recovery plan  
 











Bars of each mesh of 
same lenght 
        X         X         X         X         X 
Codend knotted to rest 
of net 




or 6mm single 
 
2x4mm double 
or 6mm single 
2x4mm double 
or 6mm single 
2x4mm double 
or 6mm single 
      N/A 
Square mesh panel 
required 1
Yes 80mm Yes 80mm Yes 80mm       No       No 
Headline panel required 
(yes/no) 
      Yes2       Yes       Yes       No      Yes3
Maximum no of 
meshes in codend 
circumference 
      120       120       100       100       N/A 
1 This requirement does not apply when the catch consists of more than 85% queen scallops or more than 40% 
sole and less than 5% cod. 
2 Attached to head rope. Must be at least 140mm mesh and extend towards rear of net for at least 15 meshes 
(does not apply when the catch consists of more than 85% Queen Scallop or more than 40% sole or less than 5% 
cod). 
3 Beam trawls with mesh of 80mm+ must have 180mm mesh panel fitted to headline (or 3 meshes abaft 
headline) of length found by – Beam Length in M/12 x 5400/Min mesh size panel. 















































































Instructions of Days at Sea 
 
 
-  A day present within an area shall be any period of 24 hours during which a vessel is present at any time 
within an area defined in point 2 and absent from port.. The time from which the 
24-hour period is measured is at the discretion of the Member State whose flag is flown by the vessel 
concerned.  
 
- Member states may aggregate the days at sea in management periods of up to 11 months. When a vessel has 
used its allocated days it may no longer leave port within this management period 
 
- If higher allocation is given to a vessel based on a low percentage of by-catch of a species as given in 
table_ , that vessel shall at no time retain more than that percentage. 
 
- Before the first day of a management period the master of a vessel shall notify which gear or gears he 
intends to use. A vessel may be allowed to use two types of gear and the days shall be allocated as half of the 
days for each gear type added together, but only one type of gear is allowed on board at any given trip, and 
the master of the vessel shall inform the authorities prior to the trip of which gears he intends to use (2005: 
unless the type of fishing gear has not changed from the one notified for the previous trip). If either of these 
requirements is not followed the vessel will no longer be allowed to use two gear types (2005: a vessel 
wishing to combine the use of one or more of the mentioned fishing gears with any other unregulated gear, 
shall not be restricted in the use of the unregulated gear. Must pre-notify when the regulated gear is to be 
used, if notno gear mentioned will may be carried on board. Such vessels must be authorised and equipped to 
undertake the alternative fishing activity.) 
 
- A vessel fishing in any of these areas may not at any time carry on board two of the gear types in the table 
 
- A vessel which in any given management period has used the number of days present in the area or absent 
from port to which it is eligible, shall remain in port or out of any area referred to in point 2 for the 
remainder of the management period. (2005: unless using only unregulated gear.) 
 
- A vessel which has used its allocated days in a management period may engaged in non-fishing activities 
that has been notified to the Member State together with the nature of its activity and that it surrenders its 
fishing licence for this time. Such vessels shall not carry any fishing gear or fish on board during that time. 
 
- Transfer of days between vessels of the same gear grouping in the same area within the same management 
period shall be allowed as long as the number of days multiplied by the engine power in kilowatts of the donor 
vessel equals the number of days multiplied by the receiver vessel engine power (2005: a member state may 
allow a transfer of days when a licensed donor vessel has temporarily ceased its activity without public help.) 
 
- No transfer of days will be allowed for those vessels benefiting from the derogations listed in table_, nor for 
those vessels allowed to use two fishing gears. 
 
- On request from the Commission, Member States shall provide reports on the transfers that have taken place
 
- A member state shall not permit fishing in any of the areas with any of the mentioned gears if no record of 
such fishing activity for 2001, 2002 and 2003 exist. Unless it ensures that equivalent capacity is prevented 
from fishing in the regulated area (2005: a vessel with a track record of using one of the mentioned gears may 
be authorised to use a different gear defined in point 4, provided that the number of days allocated to this 
latter gear is greater than or equal to the number of days allocated to the first gear) 
 
( 2005: - a member state shall not count against the days allocated to any of its vessels under this annex either 
any days when the vessel has been absent from port but unable to fish because it was assisting  another vessel 
in need of emergency aid or any days when a vessel has been absent from port but unable to fish because it is 
transporting an injured crew member for emergency medical aid. The member state shall provide justification 
to the Commission within one month of any decisions taken on this basis with associated evidence of the 
emergency from the competent authorities.) 
Table D: Instructions for ”Days at Sea” 
Table E:  Days at sea restrictions as the number of days in a calendar month a vessel may be present in the area or 










Derogation1: Derogation 2 Derogation 3 
demersal trawls, seines or 
similar towed gears of mesh 
size equal to or greater than 
100 mm except beam trawls; 
 
 
10 10 If the 2002 vessel track record 
show less than 5% of each of 
cod, sole and plaice= No 
restrictions OR: If the 2002 
vessel track record show less 
than 5% cod and is using either: 
100-120mm nets= extra 4 days. 
Or more than 120mm nets=extra 
5 days 
derogations for the saithe 
fishery without the requirement 
for a track record in previous 
years of fishing with less than 
5 % by catch may be allocated 
if called for by member states. 
Along with its request the 
Member State shall submit 
details of the vessels that 
would benefit, with evidence 
of their quota holding and 
planned activity 4 weeks ahead 
of management period 
2005- 100-120mm nets = extra 3 
days, and  more than 120mm 
nets= extra 4 days 
 
2005: this derogation does not 
apply  
An additional TWO days will 
be available for vessels of this 
fishing gear operating in the 
Irish Sea in recognition of the 
area closure and the assumed 
reduction in fishing mortality of 
cod. 
 
2005: An additional ONE days 
will be available for vessels of 
this fishing gear operating in the 
Irish Sea in recognition of the 
area closure and the assumed 
reduction in fishing mortality of 
cod. 
 
2005: New category for this 
year: Demersal trawl of 
mesh soze greater than 
120mm 
 10 One additional day may be 
allocated by the Commission on 
a request from the member state 
on the condition that the member 
state concerned has developed a 
system of automatic suspensions 
of fishing licences in respect of 
infringements. During such a 
prerequisite that vessel may not 
at any time carry on board any 
fishing gear of mesh size less 
than or equal to 120 mm. 
  
beam trawls of mesh size 
equal to or greater than 80 
mm 
14 13 An additional two days will be 
available for vessels of this 
fishing gear operating in the Irish 
Sea in recognition of the area 
closure and the assumed 
reduction in fishing mortality of 
cod. 
  
static demersal nets 
including gill nets, trammel 
nets and tangle nets 
14 13 If these gear are of mesh size 
equal to or greater than 220mm 
and the 2002 vessel track record 
show less than 5% cod and more 
than 5% of turbot and lumpfish= 
up to 6 extra days 
2005: this derogation does not 
apply to the Irish Sea 
If the vessels carrying these 
gears of mesh size equal to or 
less than 110 mm, is less than 
15 metres in length with 
landings of over 35% 
unregulated species and absent 
from port for no more than 24 
hours up can be allowed to fish 
up to 20 days 
 2005: this derogation does not 




17 16    
trawls, seines or similar 
towed gears of mesh size 
between 70 mm and 90 
mm(2005: 99mm) except 
beam trawls with mesh size 
between 80 mm and 99 mm; 
22 21    
demersal trawls, seines or 
similar towed gears of mesh 
size between 16 mm and 32 
mm except beam trawls 
20 19 If the 2002 vessel track record 
show less than 5% of each of 





Appendix IV:   Background information compliance, control and surveillance 
 
Both in the proposal and in the subsequent Council Regulation (No 423/2004), the 
provisions of TITLE IIA “Control of Fishing Effort” of Council Regulation 2847/93 are 
addressed. While the proposal mentions the whole TITLE IIA, the Regulation points to 
Article 19a, 19b, 19c, 19d and 19 k (the last one is as far as I can find not existing) in its 
article 9. This Title starts by defining the fishing areas and resources for which these 
arrangements apply. This is done by referring to Articles 2, 3 (5) and 9 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 685/95 These articles concern themselves with vessels over 18 metres (or over 15 
metres between perpendiculars) and here follows an effort to summarize the main points.  
Article 19b deals with something called the “Effort Report” which shall include 
communication from the Master of Community vessels on  
- the name, external identification mark, radio call sign and name of the master  
- the geographical location of the vessel to which the communication refers 
- the date and time of: 
 - each entry into, and exit from, a port located inside the area 
 - each entry into an area 
 - each exit from an area 
- the catch retained on board by species in kilograms live weight 
It also addresses the requirement for vessels conducting trans-zonal fisheries during a period 
of 24 hours to communicate their first entry and last exit within that time period and for the 
member states to ensure that masters of fishing vessels comply with the reporting obligations. 
The Article ends by referring to article 36 concerning the detailed rules for implementation. In 
other words this reference is to the 1992 decision on establishing a Management Committee 
for Fisheries and Aquaculture consisting of representatives of the Member Stares set up in 
order to assist the Commission. In Article 4 and 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 
the duties of these Committees are described. First the Committees are to comment on 
propositions of measures to be taken from the Commission and secondly each committee shall 
adopt its own rules of procedure. Now we return to Article 19c and continue with control of 
fishing effort. Article 19c lists how these effort reports should be communicated (by fax, 
telephone or radio) to the flag member state or the state(s) under which jurisdiction the fishing 
activities takes place and therefore is responsible for monitoring, immediately before each 
entry and exit. The rest deals with specifications of reporting duties for trans-zonal fisheries, 
fishing in waters in which the vessel is registered and for vessels that spend less than 72 hours 
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at sea and conduct fishing in waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of another member 
state. Article 19d is short and states that Member States shall ensure that the effort reports are 
recorded in computer-readable form. The last relevant article (If we look away from 19k) is 
19e and it addresses more specifically the logbooks of the vessels and how the Masters shall 
account for the time spent in an area. For towed gear the date and time of entry into an area or 
exit from a port in that area and the date and time of the vessel from an area or of entry into a 
port located in that area shall be registered. In the case of static gear the date and time of entry 
into an area or exit from a port in that area, the date and time of setting or re-setting of static 
gear in the area concerned, time and date of the completion of the fishing operation and the 
date and time of exit from that area or of entry into a port located in that area.  
 After this short time travel back to the 90s, we return to Council Regulation (No 
423/2004) establishing measures for the recovery of cod stocks revealsl more on the 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of the Cod Recovery Plan. 
 
Article 31 2(a) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 invites the Council to draw up a list 
of types of serious infringements against which the Member States shall take serious and 
deterrent action. Such a list is presented in Council regulation (EC) No 1447/1999. 
The list includes the following infringements: 
A. Failure to cooperate with the authorities responsible for monitoring 
B. Failure to cooperate with observers 
C. Failure to observe the conditions to be met when fishing 
D. Failure to comply during fishing operations 
E. Failure to comply in connection with resources for monitoring 
F. Failure to comply in connection with landing and marketing of fishery products 
In order to improve the transparency in the CFP Member States shall inform the Commission 
on a regular basis of the infringements that have been revealed and all information regarding 
action taken by the authorities. Each year a Communication shall be published by the 
Commission publicly detailing the infringements of fisheries rules detected by Member States 
with specifications on the type of procedure taken and the penalties imposed in these 
As long as we are looking at Council Regulation No 2371/2002 let us take a look at Articles 
22(1)(b) which goes as follows: “ a fishing vessel shall have installed on board a functioning 
system which allows detection and identification of that vessel by remote monitoring systems. 
This requirement applies to vessels exceeding 18 metres length overall as from 1 January 
2004 and to vessels exceeding 15 metres length overall as from 1 January 2005.”  Such a 
 103
system is called satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and article 23(3) touches 
upon the same theme when it instructs Member States to set up administrative and technical 
structures necessary for ensuring effective control, inspection and enforcement, including 
satellite based VMS. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2244/2003 provides the provisions for 
this. 
 
Appendix V: Decommissioning 
 
Ever since 1983 there have been measures taken in order to reduce or balance fishing effort 
within the European Union. Decommissioning is permanent reduction in capacity through 
voluntary scrapping of redundant vessels with financial compensation to leave the fishery. In 
1983 the first Multiannual Guidance Programme (MAGP I) was launched in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2908/83. It was to last until 1986 and by this time it was clear that it 
had been a failure as there had been a continued expansion in many fisheries. The reasons for 
this were that capacity was measured in different ways; there were no annual targets or 
objectives and little experience in structural policy. MAGP II lasted from 1987 to 1991 and 
tried to mend the fallacies of the previous programme. This was not achieved and another 
failure was a fact partly due to the increased competition in the wake of Spain and Portugal 
entering the Union and more than doubled the fishing fleet. MAGP III (1992-1996) came with 
a new scope which was setting different reduction targets for different species. Fishing for 
demersal species was to be reduced by 30 %, fishing on benthic stocks reduced by 20 % and 
no reduction for pelagic stocks. After strong objections from Member States these targets 
were reduced to 20 % and 15% respectively. Several new aspects were introduced under this 
programme, first of all that reduction was expressed in terms of effort and not capacity as it 
had been previously. Effort was defined as the product of capacity (tonnage), installed power 
and the number of days spent at sea per reference period. A common set of vessel 
measurements, creation of a community register of fishing vessels and the possibility to keep 
vessels at port for set periods (Tie-up) were also novelties. Technical progress was estimated 
to contribute with a 2 % increase in fishing effort and a corresponding decrease was called for. 
In spite of the new regimes of segmenting the fleets adding to confusion and providing 
Member States with new ways of bending the rules, the overall reduction target for the EU 
was met by the end of 1996. But the incentives were uneven, and states like UK and 
Netherlands were far from meeting their individual reduction objectives. Other concerns at 
this time were that effort reduction often failed to happen for the most overexploited stocks. 
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These were logically enough, in areas of strong dependence on fisheries and the lack of socio-
economic support complicated the process. Decline in fish prices resulted in increased fishing 
and the overall goal of capacity reduction, namely keep stocks at sustainable level, failed. 
This encouraged the introduction of different reduction objectives for stocks in different 
situations under MAGP IV (1997- 2001 (02)). Fishing effort for stocks in danger of collapse 





















































5th interview in Galway: Ciaran Kelly 
Fisheries Scientist at the Pelagic section, 
Fisheries Science Services (FSS) Marine 
Institute Rinville Oranmore Co Galway
3rd interview in Dublin: Lorcán Ó 
Cinnéide, Chief Executive of the 
Irish Fish Producers Organisation 
(IFPO) 
 
2nd interview at Dún Laoghaire: Dominic 
Rihan (Marine Technical Executive), 
Emmet Jackson (Marine Technical Officer) 
and Patricia Comiskey , Quality and 
Environment Project Co-ordinator  (also 
secretary of the RAC-sjekk navnet
 IRISH FISHERMEN’S 
ORGANISATION LTD
1st interview in Dublin: Joe 





4th interview at Kilkeel: Alan McCulla, CEO 
of the Anglo North Irish Fish Producers 
Organisation Ltd 
6th interview: By telephone in September 
2006.  Barrie Deas Chief Excecutive of 
the National Federation of Fishermen’ s 
Organisation (NFFO) UK. 
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